The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR JACK B. KUBISCH

Interviewed by: Henry E. Mattox
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTERVIEW

Q: Now I am going to read into the record, just for the sake of the record, Ambassador Kubisch, a very brief resume of your background.

You were born in 1921 in Missouri. You were educated at the University of Missouri, at Harvard and you have an Honorary Doctorate from Central Methodist College.

Incidentally, I would like for you to add or subtract to anything that is significant, whether I have it right or not.

You were in the Navy in World War II as an officer. You entered the Foreign Service in 1947, served at two posts, Brazil and Paris. Was that Rio in Brazil?

KUBISCH: Yes, it was.

Q: And then you resigned and took a position in private industry for ten years, from about '51 to '61?

KUBISCH: That's correct.

Q: You re-entered the Foreign Service as a senior officer, served in Ceylon, Brazil again, and then you were DCM in Mexico and DCM at Paris. You were Assistant Secretary for the American Republics, Latin America, that is. And then from 1974 to 1977, you were the Ambassador in Greece. Then for two years after you were Vice-President of the National Defense University in Washington and you retired in 1979.

But subsequent to retirement, you served for several years as a consultant to the Department of State, including as Special U.S. Negotiator for the Spanish Bases Treaty.

KUBISCH: That's true.

Q: Anything I left out? Or anything that needs to be added of consequence?

KUBISCH: I think that basically summarizes the high points of my career.

Q: Let me just get this kicked off a little bit. I started off with a couple of questions about the earlier days of your Foreign Service career. What was it that attracted you to a career in the foreign affairs in the first place?

KUBISCH: Well, ever since I can remember I have had an interest in international affairs. After I got out of the Navy in 1945, I went to the Harvard Business School. On all my elective courses I took international subjects like international economic relations, commercial analysis of foreign countries and so on, thinking that I might pursue a career in the international field.

It was while I was at the Harvard Business School that I met a young man by the name of Bill McFadden, who later became a Foreign Service officer. He had already passed the exams for the Foreign Service and was coming into the Foreign Service. I then took the exams and entered the Foreign Service in '47.

Q: One of you two early posts was Paris, as part of the Marshall Plan operation, and you were an assistant to Averell Harriman?

KUBISCH: That's correct, in a sense. I was a very junior assistant.

Q: But you were with, or near, or around Averell Harriman?

KUBISCH: To some extent, yes.

Q: Your impressions of him, please?

KUBISCH: Well, my impressions of Governor Harriman, as he like to be called later, were always very favorable. He was a very dedicated and hard-working man, and I think he served his country admirably in his posts abroad.

Not to his knowledge at the time, we used to refer to him as "Honest Ave the Hairsplitter," because he was very meticulous about what he did and how he did it and very thorough.

I should add that my assignment was basically in organizational and management matters and in helping to establish ECA or Marshall Plan missions in several countries. I had been transferred to Paris to do this work because of some related work I had done earlier in my first assignment in Brazil.

Q: What did you do exactly? What did you do precisely to carry out this responsibility?

KUBISCH: In Paris?

Q: Yes.

KUBISCH: Well, I worked with the Administrative Division of OSR, the Office of the Special Representative, as it was called.

Q: Who was Harriman?

KUBISCH: That's correct. Ambassador Harriman. And I worked with the Administrative Division's personnel and others in setting up certain jobs and positions as the organization was being established.

I had several co-lateral assignments. I was sent to the Marshall Plan mission in Paris, which was really just a couple of blocks away to fill in when an administrative officer was absent from that mission for some weeks. I was sent to Vienna on a similar assignment. I was sent to Lisbon, before we had a Marshall Plan mission there in 1949, to do such things as find space to set up a mission, to hire personnel, to acquire equipment, and so on. I was a Portuguese speaker at the time.

Q: You were at the Talleyrand?

KUBISCH: My office was in Hotel Wagram.

Q: Well, I don't want to pursue this really too much farther because it is pretty far back in your career.

You said you have some reservations about forgetfulness or not having access to the documentation or what was it?

KUBISCH: Well, that's true. When you invited me to participate in this program, for which I thank you and the others involved, I recognized as I started to think about what I might be able to do to contribute to it, that even my senior level assignments, at the minister level or the ambassadorial level, were many years ago--10 or 15 years ago, or more. I don't have ready access at hand to classified records or accounts, so my memory might be a little bit faulty. And there are still some things that though they may occur to me, for rather special reasons, I might feel that I couldn't really comment on at this time. But I'll certainly try and do the best I can, and be as accurate as I can.

Q: Before we get away from that, there is one thing that interests me. The reputation of Harriman. As I recall, he had a rather fierce reputation, did he not, of biting people's heads off and things of that sort?

KUBISCH: Well, possibly. I think that there are probably others that are being interviewed who worked much more closely with Ambassador Harriman than I did, who would be better qualified to comment on it.

But I do remember one occasion, in Paris, and I saw examples of it later, in Washington and in Brazil, when he came to Brazil once when I was there the second time in the early '60's, where he could come down on people pretty hard.
I remember one meeting, he was present and presiding, and some of the senior officers, I was not one of them in Paris at the time, but some of the senior officers were saying they had had a meeting with representatives of other governments and countries in Europe. They were discussing a certain issue. They were planning to pursue this discussion with these representatives of other governments several days later.

Harriman said something to the effect about, "Well, have you worked out the United States position and do you have a draft of it prepared to table?"

One of the responsible senior officers, I forget who it was at the moment, said, "Well, no, we were going to go and see what the other governments thought."

Harriman did sort of have a semi-blow up saying, "You know, don't ever go into a meeting without your own draft to put on the table that you can show to others. Then you

can get their suggestions and comments on it. And you can adjust it or negotiate it. But if you wait for them to put their draft on the table first, you are at a disadvantage." Words to that effect.

Q: Well, we'll jump ahead a bit to your days as DCM in Mexico, shall we say. I better come back to the AID relationship in a moment, which showed up in your Brazil days more. In Paris, when you were DCM, in the '70's, you arrived to assume charge, in a manner of speaking, as the executive officer of a very large embassy.

KUBISCH: '71 to '73. Are we talking about Mexico, now, or Paris?

Q: Sorry, what did I say? Paris?

KUBISCH: Well, you said both, I think.

Q: Okay, let's go back to Mexico. Now, Mexico is equally large, as Paris. Who was the ambassador in Mexico at the time?

KUBISCH: His name was Robert McBride.

Q: Careerist.

KUBISCH: Careerist. And a very fine ambassador.

Q: What areas of responsibility did he devolve upon you as DCM?

KUBISCH: Ambassador McBride had served himself, just before going to Mexico, as ambassador in Zaire, and had also been, as I recall, the minister or deputy chief of mission in Madrid, Spain and in Paris, France. So he knew the role very well that a DCM should play and what the role of an ambassador should be.

Basically, what he did, was to allow me during my two years as his deputy, to serve as the chief operating officer of the embassy. I really ran the embassy and all the sections and divisions of it, and supervised the 19 consulates, under his overall policy, guidance, and supervision.

It's a position, as you know, that is comparable perhaps to being an executive officer in the Navy on a ship, or executive vice-president or chief operating officer of a large corporation. So when I arrived there, he allowed me to take over those responsibilities. I learned a great deal from him and how to carry them out.

Q: What did he reserve to himself?

KUBISCH: He reserved to himself the following: He handled all cabinet level contacts. He dealt personally with the Foreign Minister of Mexico and other cabinet level officers. He also dealt with the President of Mexico.

He gave overall policy guidance to me and he would review with me the most important activities of the embassy. I would usually meet with him twice a day, the first thing in the morning, after we had read the overnight messages and news, and then again at the end of the day. There was a steady stream of messages out of the embassy, and there were hundreds and hundreds of them going back and forth with Washington every month, and maybe dozens or scores every day. I would usually reserve one, or two, or three, of those to go over with him at the end of the day, for his information and approval.

Q: Before they went out?

KUBISCH: Before they went out. Usually one, or two, or three, if he were in town.

Q: Did you have precise guidelines for the sections of the embassy as to what they could resolve on their own, for example, signing off cables and what must be bucked up to you?

KUBISCH: Pretty well, yes. Occasionally there would be a misunderstanding, but no often. I met with all the counselors of the embassy and section chiefs daily. Either as a group or, on those days when one or more of them was not present at the group meeting, I would be in close touch with them by phone or otherwise. They would come to my office or I would go to theirs. So there was not much room for misunderstanding on levels of responsibility.

Q: Well, this was the early '70s.

KUBISCH: Actually the late '60's, '69 to '71, I was in Mexico.

Q: '69 to '71, Mexico, yes. What were one or two of the major issues facing the United States in Mexico at that time?

KUBISCH: Well, one that hit me between the eyes right after my arrival there was something called Operation Intercept. I was assigned to Mexico, as I recall, in August of '69 and arrived there just as the United States Government virtually closed the border between Mexico and the United States of about a thousand miles as a result of a program designed in the United States to try and stop the flow of marijuana and other drugs coming into the United States from Mexico.

This was done without advance notice to the Government of Mexico or to the American Embassy in Mexico City. It was a program designed by a task force in Washington, following President Nixon coming to office in January of '69. The head of it was the Deputy Attorney General, Richard Kleindienst. Others on it were the Commissioner of

Customs, Myles Ambrose, the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement, Eugene Rossides, the head of the Drug Enforcement Agency, and others.

They decided that this was a serious problem that needed to be addressed, that we needed more energetic cooperation from Mexico, and were unsatisfied with the amount of cooperation they were getting. They decided to embark on a program that would bring about a very grave slowdown of passage of personnel and automobiles between the two countries and to get the Government of Mexico's attention so they would cooperate.

Q: The reaction of the Government of Mexico initially was to the embassy I take it?

KUBISCH: It was. And through the Mexican Embassy in Washington to the highest levels of the U.S. Government, and it was one of outrage.

Q: Well, I imagine that's in the reporting on the record. This wouldn't be in the reporting, however, how did you deal with it in the embassy? How did Ambassador McBride cope with it?

KUBISCH: After some days of discussions back and forth between Ambassador McBride, and me, and Mexican government officials, and in Washington, it was decided to set up a joint task force with a Mexican government component and a U.S. government component, to address the issues and to try and develop some recommendations to the two governments to deal with the problems. Those two task forces were chaired by me as the minister and deputy chief of mission in our embassy in Mexico and by a senior officer in the Mexican Department of Justice. And we met morning, noon, and night, for about six or eight weeks to deal with the issues.

The results of our deliberations and negotiations are available now, and the program came to be known as Operation Cooperation, Operation Cooperation, instead of Operation Intercept.

Q: Other major issues while you were in Mexico at this senior level?

KUBISCH: There were many, many issues. There is no country in the world, I suppose, with which we have a broader range of interaction, negotiations and discussions than with the government of Mexico. But I think it might be preferable to move on to other things.

Q: You received notification then that you were going to be DCM in Paris?

KUBISCH: Yes.

Q: How does such an assignment come about?

KUBISCH: That's a very good question because it doesn't happen very often. It happened as follows. President Nixon appointed a non-career officer to be ambassador to Paris, his

name was Arthur K. Watson. He was one of two Watson brothers who were the sons of really the builder of the International Business Machines company. And Arthur Watson, known as Dick, that was his nickname, and his brother Tom Watson, Jr., were these two brothers.

Well, Dick Watson had been appointed ambassador to Paris and was looking for a new DCM in his embassy there. I understand he considered about 20 or 25, interviewing many of them, and rejected them all. And he, for one reason or another heard about me, in Mexico.

In fact, an inspector from the Foreign Service Inspection Corps, had recently inspected the embassy in Mexico and had given our embassy in Mexico very high marks, including some favorable comments about my performance as DCM.

Because I was a French speaker, from my earlier service in Paris with the Marshall Plan, and for reasons of study, my name also was brought to Watson's attention. He sent a personal associate of his, who had worked for him at IBM, to Mexico City to meet and become acquainted with me, and to report back to Ambassador Watson whether or not he thought the two of us would be compatible. He said yes, and so Ambassador Watson asked Secretary of State Rogers if he would have me come from Mexico to meet Watson when he was visiting in the United States. I did. Watson and I met. And he asked for my assignment to Paris as his DCM.

I should add that I didn't really want the assignment, believe it or not. Although it's a highly prized assignment in the Foreign Service and it was, in many ways, a fine opportunity. But I had already been serving at senior levels and had earlier had the rank of a class 4 chief of mission in Brazil. I had been given the impression that if I did a good job in Mexico that my next assignment would be as an ambassador. So I was not keen to go on, having acted as DCM in Brazil for a time and for a full tour in Mexico and had had a senior job in the State Department, in being another DCM. But Secretary Rogers told me personally at the time that he wanted me to go because they wanted to satisfy Ambassador Watson, and he assured me that after a suitable period he would certainly support me to become an ambassador.

Q: Do you recall in the late '50's, I can't think of the name of the person, but our ambassador in Chile was transferred from that position to DCM in Paris?

KUBISCH: Yes, Cecil Lyon.

Q: Cecil Lyon, yes. So, it was not exactly a come down for you?

KUBISCH: Oh, not at all. To be minister, DCM, in Paris, I suppose many in the Foreign Service would say is a much more important assignment than many ambassadorial assignments in many countries of the world. So I went there and served as best I could.

Q: What's the role of a DCM, in Paris, a very large embassy, under a different ambassador, that is to say, a non-career ambassador? Is the role substantially different there from the role that you played in Mexico City?

KUBISCH: It turned out to be somewhat different, through no desire of mine, because I endeavored to perform in Paris as I had in Mexico. But Ambassador Watson, who was very intelligent and very devoted to serving his country, was obviously not as experienced as a man who had spent several decades in the Foreign Service.

I could give you an example, if you wish, of the kind of problem that arose. During the time I was in Paris, 1971 to '73, the Vietnam peace negotiations were going on and there was a special mission to conduct those negotiations. Periodically, the President's National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger and others, would come from Washington to participate in those negotiations with the North Vietnamese and others. The head of the U.S. mission to the negotiations in Paris was Ambassador William J. Porter, who later became Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.
Ambassador Watson had no authority over these negotiations except to the extent they affected our relations with the government of France. He was strictly in charge of bilateral affairs. He was not entirely happy with the negotiations, the way they were going and the way they were being conducted.

One day a few weeks after my arrival, while he was out of the embassy at lunch, a delegation of Americans came to the embassy to present a petition protesting the U.S. role in Vietnam and other things relating to the negotiations. I was called in my office by the Marine security guard about what he should do with this delegation. I had him hold the phone while I checked to see if a consular officer was present, on the ground floor of the embassy, and there was one. I instructed the Marine guard and the consular officer to receive the American delegation, there were four or five Americans in it, to take their petition, accept it, and tell them it would be forwarded through appropriate channels to Washington.

When Ambassador Watson came back from lunch, he was really incensed that I had done that. He was very angry with me. It was the first real show of anger he had ever demonstrated to me. He was angry because I had allowed an officer in his embassy to receive this group. He felt that he wanted nothing to do with such a delegation or the Vietnam negotiations.

I explained to him that American citizens, whether in the United States or abroad, have the right to petition their government. Abroad their proper place to go to present such a petition was the embassy and to a consular officer. This was quite appropriate and their petition should be forwarded to Washington. Ambassador Watson gave me a very hard time and I got very angry myself and stalked out of his office.

I was wondering, I had only been there about a month, whether I had done the right thing in going to Paris. But not long thereafter, he was basically a very generous and kind man,

Watson had calmed down. He came into my office and we made up. We never really had a serious problem after that.

But that's an example of how a politically appointed ambassador might not know something that a career officer would know immediately. There were many other times, on vastly more important things, where I believe I helped Ambassador Watson avoid serious errors or pitfalls, and I think he would agree.

Q: Yes, it's not exactly a nuance, it's just a procedural question.

KUBISCH: Sure.

Q: This was in '71, then I guess?

KUBISCH: It was, about in December of '71 as I recall, or January of '72.

Q: Did he come to realize that what you had done was something you really had no alternative to, that it was something you had to do?

KUBISCH: I believe so. But in any case, I have the impression that his confidence in me as the weeks went by slowly grew as he recognized that I was doing my utmost to serve him well and to serve the embassy well. I think he came to have substantial regard for me, as I did for him, and we became very good friends.

So much so that later, after he had resigned from the embassy and I was back in Washington, he organized a business in the United States, in which he invested some millions of dollars of his own money. He was very well-to-do. He offered me a partnership in it, with no investment on my part, which I did not accept since I was still committed to the Foreign Service.

Q: Well, that's dedication, all right. Was Ambassador Porter's office in the embassy there?

KUBISCH: It was in an annex of the embassy. Ambassador Porter had words with Ambassador Watson on more than one occasion too, overheard by others, including me.

Q: He was in B building?

KUBISCH: Yes. And Heyward Isham, a career Foreign Service Officer, was his deputy.

Q: What were the words about?

KUBISCH: Well, I remember once when Dr. Kissinger was coming with a delegation from Washington for the talks. Usually when he came, Ambassador Porter went to the

airport to meet him, as did Ambassador Watson, and several others of us, depending on who was on the delegation.

In the VIP waiting room, waiting for the plane to come in one night, Ambassador Porter was in an adjacent, smaller waiting room with Ambassador Watson, with the door closed. They had some words about something and all of a sudden there was some, almost shouting going on as Ambassador Porter charged Ambassador Watson with being poorly informed and just a spoiled, rich man who had come to Paris because of his political support of President Nixon.

Q: You don't know what the point of contention was?

KUBISCH: I didn't hear it at the outset, all I heard was the louder words later.

Q: Your impressions of Kissinger?

KUBISCH: My impressions of Kissinger at that time or subsequent?

Q: At that time.

KUBISCH: I should say that I met Kissinger when I was DCM in Mexico and came to know him and worked with him several times when I was chargé there. He was always very interested in Mexico.

When he came to Paris over about a year and a half, I saw him a lot. I didn't work with him on Vietnam negotiations. He had a delegation for that. Although I had some ancillary and collateral responsibilities,
particularly when I was chargé.

But my impression was always very favorable. He was a guest in my home, the DCM residence, many, many times, because he had difficulty getting away from the press. We used to have small, private dinners or gatherings there when a friend of his would come from some other country or somewhere to meet us there. It afforded him some privacy and respite from these continuous negotiations. I came to know him very well and we became very close. I think he has always regarded me as a good friend. My opinion of him, and his abilities, is very high.

Q: You never had any occasion to have any friction with him?

KUBISCH: Oh, yes, I had friction with him. I had friction, particularly, when I was Assistant Secretary of State, once when he was in the White House, before he became Secretary and then again, on more than one occasion, while he was Secretary. We had differences.

But they were always fairly well resolved, resolved to my satisfaction, at least. They were not often policy differences. However, on a couple of occasions there were policy differences which almost led to my resigning from my past.

Q: Can you give me an example?

KUBISCH: Well, yes I guess I can. There were two occasions. One had to do with the overthrow of President Allende in Chile and the other had to do with a very important, to me, personnel matter. Do you want me to discuss those at this point?

Q: Yes.

KUBISCH: Well, let me leave the Chile one for the moment in case we discuss Chile and my service in ARA as Assistant Secretary.

Q: I think we are at your service in ARA, aren't we?

KUBISCH: Are we? All right. Fine. Well, let me speak first on the personnel question. When I went back as Assistant Secretary, it was Henry Kissinger (he was still the President's National Security Advisor) and
Secretary Rogers, the two of them, who asked me to come back and offered me my choice of two senior jobs in the State Department.

I chose the Assistant Secretary for Latin America Affairs. Even so, I was somewhat surprised, as well as honored, that they would think of me for those jobs, because I had never served as an ambassador abroad. I had wanted to go as an ambassador, but they explained to me that this was more important than being an ambassador. They were going to put me in charge of a region, where a number of embassies were involved. They told me that they had talked to President Nixon about it and to other senior people in the White House, who were organizing the second Nixon Administration, after his re-election in 1972.

I was told by Secretary Rogers that I could select my own deputies, the Deputy Assistant Secretary positions. And so I selected several, because to run a busy bureau in the State Department, as you know, Henry, is a very big and time consuming job. It's not the sort of thing one man can do all by himself. It is more of a collegial executive.

By that time the State Department division for Latin America, ARA, and the Latin American division of AID had been integrated and the Assistant Secretary was in charge of both. Because of my experience and background in economic affairs and in AID affairs, and my service several times in Brazil and in charge of Brazilian affairs as the Brazilian desk officer in Washington, and my service in Mexico, I looked for deputies who would complement my experience. I selected Ambassador William Bowdler, who had served twice as an ambassador in Central America, had been the Cuba desk officer in the State Department, had served on the National Security Council staff and knew the Caribbean

and Central America well, and a man by the name of Harry Shlaudeman, who was DCM in Chile at the time and knew well other countries in South America that I was less familiar with.

I brought them back, together with two others that I retained in the bureau, Ambassador John Jova, who was our ambassador to the OAS and Daniel Szabo as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs. And this formed the key group. Bowdler was the senior man among them.

I traveled a great deal in my early weeks and months in that bureau and after one prolonged absence of several weeks, after Henry Kissinger had become Secretary of State, when I got back from my trip, the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Dean Brown, came to see me. He said that Secretary Kissinger wanted me to replace Ambassador Bowdler as my deputy.

When I asked why, Brown said, he wasn't sure but he didn't think Kissinger thought Bowdler was the right man for the job. So I said I wouldn't agree to that without knowing the reasons. So Under Secretary Brown said, "You will have to discuss that with Secretary Kissinger."

I sent word to Kissinger's office that I would like to see him and discuss this with him. I told Brown that if Kissinger insisted that Bowdler go that I would prefer that he find another Assistant Secretary to take my place because I felt it was unfair both to Bowdler and to me.

About a week went by and late one Friday afternoon I got a call from Larry Eagleburger, who at this time was Kissinger's executive assistant, saying that Secretary Kissinger would like to see me, to please stand by to discuss this matter. I said fine. Finally, about 7:30 or 8 o'clock that Friday evening I got a call to come up to Kissinger's office.

When I got there, Eagleburger was inside with
Kissinger alone, and Kissinger, as he did occasionally, I could hear his voice through the door, was chewing Eagleburger out about something. And finally Eagleburger came out and slammed the door, said something to me which I won't repeat now about Kissinger particularly since they are working together these days in New York. But it was in the heat of the moment, and he said, "Okay, he's all yours, Jack."

I went in, and Kissinger and I had a discussion about Ambassador Bowdler. I made my view known to him and he was very upset with me. He said he would think it over and let me know his decision. I never heard from him about it again. And by agreement with his office I never sent Ambassador Bowdler to any of Kissinger's staff meetings. So he never really worked with him much. But Bowdler stayed on as did I.

Q: You never did find out what it was all about then?

KUBISCH: Well, I think it was just a personal thing. I can't really go beyond that except to say that Ambassador Bowdler subsequently and in somewhat later years became Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America himself under President Carter and Secretary Vance and Secretary Muskie, I believe.

Q: Bowdler must have stepped on a Kissinger toe somehow?

KUBISCH: Well, Bowdler was a man who expressed his views, fully and frankly, honestly and sincerely. He was not a yes man, by any means, so that may have had something to do with it. But in my view, Bowdler was a very highly qualified, dedicated and successful Foreign Service officer.

Q: Incidentally, I heard somewhere, I'm not sure this is the case, that Dean Brown retired because of a run-in with Kissinger himself.

KUBISCH: That could be. Sooner or later, everybody that I knew of, who worked in a close and senior relationship with Henry, had problems with him. I had a number. Some led to a parting of the ways and some did not. You must remember the intense pressure senior officers of the Department work under, usually day and night seven days a week. Personal relationships get frayed and tempers short. There were even stories in the press from time to time that would say, "Kissinger feuding with Kubisch over policy in Latin America," or something far-fetched like that.

He blew up at me several times. But I must say this about Henry Kissinger. He came to me once, after blowing up at me about something, and I got mad and stalked away. He made a point of seeking me out, and, you know, he's a charming man when he wants to be. He put his arm around my shoulders and he made some statements to the effect that he was sorry he said what he had said to me, and that he knew that I knew the tremendous pressure he was under, and how he occasionally lost control of himself, and the friends and associates he really valued were those who understood that and stood by him, assisted him and cooperated with him, notwithstanding that, and so on.

Q: Just to change gears a little bit, the integration of State and AID. That was accomplished before you got there. How did it work though when you were Assistant Secretary? How well did it work?

KUBISCH: In my view, it worked very well, Henry. I should say that I was brought back to Washington from Brazil in January of '65 to be the Brazil desk officer. For the first time for any place in the Department of State, the Brazil program of AID and the Brazil desk of the State Department were to be integrated under one officer in charge. Since I had, at that time, the confidence of both State and AID, having been in a similar two-hat job in the biggest program they had in Latin America, in the Alliance for Progress, I was brought back to head that office.

So I worked for three or four years in charge of an integrated office of State and AID and it worked very well. The rest of the bureau was so-called "back to back," they were along side each other but not under one officer. When I came back to Washington as Assistant Secretary in '73 the entire bureau had been totally integrated and I thought it worked very well.

Q: It's still today the only bureau that has so integrated, isn't it?

KUBISCH: I believe that is true. I think many arguments can be made for keeping them separate. And many arguments can be made for integrating them.

As the officer responsible for overseeing our policies and their execution in the Latin American region, I was very glad to have the authority over both and I thought it worked very well.

And on balance that's where I would come out. I don't know whether it would be equally applicable in other regions of the world.

Q: Well, at that time the, say mid-'60s, we had a rather large AID program in Brazil, did we not?

KUBISCH: A huge one. Our program basically amounted to almost one million dollars a day in U.S. government economic assistance to Brazil. And there were 500 or 1,000 employees in the AID mission.

Q: I'm going to ask that we pause here for just a second and then I'm going to come back to that point in just a minute.

KUBISCH: Okay.

Q: One question I wanted to ask you about is AID and Brazil. There was a large AID mission and a large program. And this is one instance when I'll ask you to look back, rather than to ask for your impressions of the time. Briefly, did the AID program in Brazil do any good?

KUBISCH: The short answer to that is yes. But if you were to follow up and say, "Did it do as much good as you hoped?" The answer is no, not by any means.

I think we learned a lot and I certainly learned a lot as a result of that experience with the Alliance for Progress in Brazil. I was at a moment in my career then, and I think that the people of the United States and our country as a whole, generally speaking, were at a moment where we thought we could do anything, anywhere, politically, economically, militarily. We had helped to rebuild Europe and now we needed to go to the less developed third world countries in Asia, Latin America, and Africa, and elsewhere, and

help those poor, unfortunate people discover the blessings of democracy and of the American social, economic, and political system for a nation's life.

It was that kind of attitude, in part, that led to our involvement in Vietnam, I think.

I learned in Brazil and others did too, that we couldn't do as much as we thought we could. So it fell far short of the goals that I and others had for it.

But I understand that Ambassador Lincoln Gordon and Ambassador Jack Tuthill have been interviewed. They were ambassadors in that period, in the '60's, and I am sure that they were as well or more qualified than I, to comment on this. And I think they have been interviewed on this program.

Q: Yes. I think so. Still on Latin America, you were just mentioning a moment ago, when we broke, your set-to with Henry Kissinger over the Allende overthrow. Could you go into that one?

KUBISCH: Well, I suppose I could. It's a very important subject. I became Assistant Secretary of State in May of 1973 and on September 11, 1973, President Allende in Chile was overthrown.

There are many important aspects and dimensions to that period involving U.S.-Chilean relations and what the U.S. Government did and did not do, and what I personally was involved in and was not involved in. But narrowing it specifically to the question of my near resignation, I felt that some of the covert activities of the U.S. government, of CIA in Chile, needed to be terminated. I felt they were not in our interests at that time.

During this period when I was generally following a policy of trying to bring them to an end or to change them or alter them in some way, a proposal came from the CIA station in the Embassy in Santiago. As I recall it was about in mid or late July 1973, some six or eight weeks before Allende was overthrown.

The proposal inquired whether Dr. Kissinger in the White House, and/or Assistant Secretary Kubisch in the State Department, would be favorably inclined for the CIA station in Chile to supply money, covertly, to strikers in Chile. The truckers had gone on strike several days before.

It was a period of great economic turbulence in Chile, hyper-inflation, strikes by a wide range of professional and working people, and the indications were increasing that the government of President Allende could not survive. The CIA inquiry was whether or not we wanted to finance the striking truckers who were supposed to be bringing food and other supplies into Santiago daily. There were hundreds or thousands of them involved. This would increase the economic dislocations and perhaps accelerate the fall of the Allende regime. I said no, no payments to the truckers, no covert CIA activity of that type.

Q: Why were you of that opinion?

KUBISCH: I was of the opinion this can get rather involved, Henry, in that there is no short answer to it.
But basically, it goes to my whole view of CIA covert activities. I am not opposed to them in principle. I believe they are a means which should be available to the government of the United States, in certain, very exceptional circumstances, where vital national interests of the United States are involved and where there are no other means to serve those interests.

I did not feel that such was the case in Chile. I did not feel that vital national interests of the United States were involved in this. I did not believe that it was in the interest of the United States to try and bring about the downfall or overthrow of President Allende. I did not see any potential successor regime to him that would be desirable from the standpoint of the United States. And I thought, because of the history of CIA involvement in Chile and the electoral process there, that it was unwise, unwarranted, and indeed, most undesirable to participate and for us to fund the truckers' strike.

Word came to me that Dr. Kissinger favored disbursing funds from CIA to the truckers to enable the strike to continue. I said that I was opposed, and so a representative from Dr. Kissinger's office, the man in charge of the Latin American office in the National Security Council, a man by the name of William Jordan, who later became ambassador to Panama, and who was an associate of Dr. Kissinger, came to see me in my office as Assistant Secretary for Latin America. He said to me that Henry wanted this program to go forward. Was I prepared to resign over the matter? And I said, yes, that I was prepared to resign over it. I really felt I could not in good conscience, with the oath of office I had taken and my beliefs about serving the interests of the United States, I could not in good conscience, concur in the program. It was too important. And so he said okay, "I'll tell Henry," and he went back and told Henry.

The program was never approved. I never heard any more from Kissinger or Jordan about it. And some weeks later the government of President Allende was overthrown.

I mention this because, if young officers in the Foreign Service ever come to a position where a real question of conscience arises on a very, very major question, and that does happen to senior officers from time to time, they will know at least what one person did.

Q: But it happens less among American senior officers than it does in the senior British political sphere, does it not?

KUBISCH: I think that's true, because I think in the senior British service, government officials tend to float in and out of senior government positions with greater facility and ease than we do in the United States. I'm not sure that's true, but that's my impression.

But in any case, I'm not talking about offering your resignation every time you get an order from a superior to do something that you don't agree with. Good heavens, I've had dozens, hundreds maybe, of instructions that I didn't agree with that I carried out. And sometimes I made my views known as opposed to them and sometimes I only partially disagreed with them, but basically the business of the U.S. Government goes forward and committed public servants and Foreign Service officers carry out their instructions.

But from time to time, particularly at senior levels, a very, very, major issue arises. And that has happened to me on several occasions, a total of three. I've mentioned two of them. And the third one is still too sensitive to discuss. I didn't want to resign from the Foreign Service, I didn't want to resign as a U.S. Government official, but I wanted to resign from my particular post at that moment, and to be reassigned, rather than associate myself with a policy that I thought was contrary to the best interests of the United States.

Q: Here is another potentially sensitive question, having to do with Chile. Have you perhaps discovered since those days that things were going on that you were kept out of the loop on? Were there programs being undertaken that the Assistant Secretary for ARA, didn't know anything about?

KUBISCH: In my view, during the period I was Assistant Secretary, there were none. I think I was fully informed at that time. I could be mistaken. I've seen nothing since to lead me to believe otherwise.

However, prior to my becoming Assistant Secretary, in the late '60's and particularly, I think in the elections in Chile in 1970 and '71, there were instructions, according to since published accounts by the Senate on this matter, that President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger and the then Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Richard Helms, did have CIA conducting activities and programs, famous or infamous, "track two," that were unknown to the State Department or the Ambassador in Chile.

But that was not the case as far as I know in 1973 and '74, when I was the Assistant Secretary.

Q: I'm going to take us backward to Paris again in Just a moment, but let me pose one more opinion kind of question to you. Did the United States bring Allende down?

KUBISCH: Did the United States bring Allende down? I would have to say no, not in my opinion.

Did the United States policies and actions contribute in some way to his fall? I think that the answer to that would be yes. In my view, the U.S. Government contributed very little to his fall, not for lack of trying in the earlier periods. But I can tell you categorically that the United States Government, not the State Department, the CIA or any of these agencies or departments, were involved in the coup that overthrew him and lead to his death on September 11, 1973.

We were not involved in that coup. Indeed, there has since been ample evidence that we were not involved. Even members of the Junta that took control of the country on that day have stated, and there have been published accounts of this, that they did not want to let the United States know in advance because they were afraid we might try and head it off.

And President Ford and the Senate Committee that investigated this have confirmed that the United States was not involved in the coup.

Q: Not even by a wink and a nod?

KUBISCH: Well, Henry, I must tell you this. There was a steady stream of reports from Chile that there would be a coup to overthrow President Allende. And I don't exclude for a moment that some lower level U.S. officials, military or civilian, might have had contacts with Chilean officials of one kind or another and led them to believe, or allowed the Chileans to presume, that the U.S. government might look favorably on the fall of Allende.

Those kinds of things happen all the time. When I was in Greece the Prime Minister of Greece called me in once when I was ambassador there. This is just as an aside.

And he said, "Ambassador Kubisch, look at this." And he gave me a copy of a report by an intelligence officer in the Greek Intelligence Service, a very low level agent, who had met with an American second lieutenant or a captain, one of the 10,000 U.S. military in Greece. That American, a low level military official, had said to this Greek intelligence officer (he didn't know he was a Greek intelligence officer) "Prime Minister Karamanlis is a disaster for Greece. We wish he would be replaced and overthrown."

The intelligence officer of the Greek service wrote it up, forwarded it up through channels and it got all the way to the Prime Minister who said, "How about this, Kubisch, how do you let your people get away with this?"

And I said, "Mr. Prime Minister, we can't control what everybody says all the time."

But back to Chile as far as any official knowledge by senior U.S. officials who were in a position to make decisions concerning Chile, (we had no advance knowledge and we were not involved in the coup.)

Q: I want to go now to the contacts you were talking about off the mike, with the French Quai d'Orsay. But I don't want to do that if there is something about ARA or Latin America that I have failed to ask.

KUBISCH: Well, there is one thing more I would like to say before we leave Chile, because here again I think there is a lesson for others and some, perhaps, significant information for historians.

The history of one aspect of the overthrow of Allende has been badly distorted by the action of one professor by the name of Richard Fagen of Stanford. And I'd like to set that record straight, if I may.

What happened was this. Allende was overthrown on September 11, 1973. During the days immediately following that, as Assistant Secretary, I had meetings with a number of different groups and representatives, interested in what had happened in Chile and what this meant for U.S.-Chilean relations.

I testified at great length before House of Representatives committees and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on this matter. Much of it is unclassified, some of it classified and since declassified and available.

I had a meeting with representatives of a group called the Latin American Studies Association. The Latin American Studies Association had as it's president at the time a professor by the name of Henry Landsberger, who had been at UNC, if I'm not mistaken, and at this particular time was in Florida, at the University there. They got in touch with my office and I agreed to see a delegation from this group of professors and I think there were five that came to my office. One, Professor Landsberger, was the president of the organization, and one, Professor Fagen, from Stanford, was very interested in Latin America and very knowledgeable about it.

Q: Do you have the date?

KUBISCH: The date of that meeting, if I'm not mistaken, was Saturday, September 15, 1973, give or take a couple of days, I'm not sure.

Several weeks later, Professor Fagen wrote a letter to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Fulbright, and sent copies to a number of other Senators and Congressmen, to the New York Times, the Washington Post, Secretary of State Kissinger and others, in which he referred to me and my comments at that meeting of September 15th. He distorted what I had said. He attributed to me remarks that I did not make. And he attributed to me a point of view that I did not hold.

That letter was published in the Washington Post on the Op-Ed page, as I recall, and in the New York Times. And when it appeared, I was outraged. And I was undecided what to do about it. It appeared, I think, on about October 8th, 1973, the date of his letter was October 8, it may have appeared some few days after that.

I was undecided what to do about it and I called a meeting in my office of some of the officers working on Chilean affairs, and press and other advisors, to discuss the letter and what I should do. Some of them recommended that I write a letter immediately to the editors and set the record straight. They also said write a letter or go see Senator Fulbright and others.

Professor Fagen, in that letter, in attributing, incorrectly, views to me and statements to me that I had not made, used those purported statements as a kind of launching pad for a stream of criticism of the U.S. government and it's policies in Chile. I had no objection to his criticizing our policies. Much of his criticism was justified, I thought. But to use these particular comments and in the way that he did, I felt was outrageous.

After this meeting, I decided, getting contrary advice from various people in the room, that I would not reply. Because the press people, and others, were saying to me, "If you reply, Jack, and you publish it, you're going to get involved in an exchange of letters in the press, in a public quarrel with Professor Fagen about, you did say it or you didn't say it and it's going to go on and on and it'll just make the story live longer. Forget about it, this story will only last 24 hours, and in the meantime, there is an avalanche of stuff appearing about Chile in the papers and it'll just be forgotten and buried."

So I accepted that advice and didn't take any action. To my chagrin, that particular letter and paragraphs from that letter, quoting me, in quotations marks, incorrectly, have now appeared in a number of books and sort of gotten imbedded in the history of the period.

So I would like to take this occasion to read a letter that I got from Professor Landsberger, who was present that day.

Q: Let me ask one question also. Did you have a note taker there yourself?

KUBISCH: No, we did not. They asked me whether or not the meeting was going to be on the record, off the record or on background. And my answer, as I recall--and this was the position I took in all such meetings, with the press or others--"I will put it on any level you wish."

"If I am going to speak on the record, for attribution, then I must be much more cautious and careful of what I say because my remarks are going to be repeated by the international wire services to Chile. If you want me to be more frank and informal, I'll be glad to speak on background or off the record." They chose, this group of professors, to have it off the record.

The following letter is addressed to me, dated November 8, 1973, as Assistant Secretary of State, in Washington, and signed by Professor Henry A. Landsberger, President of the Latin American Studies Association. May I just read a couple of sentences from it?

Q: Yes. This letter has never appeared anywhere in publication?

KUBISCH: I understand that sections of it have appeared in Ambassador Nathaniel Davis' book on the fall of Allende.

He said, "Dear Mr. Kubisch. I feel I must go on record as feeling very concerned at the breach of confidence represented by my colleague, Professor Richard Fagen, publishing information based on our conversation with you of September 18."

He said September 18th, I thought it was the 15th, but I could be wrong. I haven't gone back and looked up any record of this.

Professor Landsberger goes on, "At the beginning of that conversation, no one expressed any reservations, whatsoever, at it being treated as off the record, as a result of which all sides expressed themselves with more freedom than they would have done otherwise."

"More important, however, Dr. Fagen's quotation of you as stating that, 'Only then (if Allende had served out his term) would the full discrediting of socialism have taken place, only then would people have gotten the message that socialism doesn't work.' What has happened, the military take-over and bloodshed, have confused this lesson."

Q: That's supposed to be Fagen's quotation of what you said?

KUBISCH: Yes, Fagen's quotation of what I said. Landsberger goes on, "This quotation strikes me, not only rather remotely related to his general point but it does not accord at all with my memory. My memory is that you made no general statement concerning the desirability of proving in any general way, that 'socialism doesn't work' and that your basic concerns seemed to be that the Chileans be allowed to judge after a constitutionally legitimate period of time, what benefited them and what did not. You have my full permission to send this letter to all those who might have originally seen Professor Fagen's letter." And so on. "Sincerely, Henry L. Landsberger, President."

I did want to put that in this oral history to demonstrate how such a thing can become enshrined in the history of the period and be inaccurate and incorrect. My own views about the overthrow of Allende have been fully covered in published testimony, unclassified, and if you want me to I'll be glad to repeat them here or quote from that testimony.

It is not what Professor Fagen attributed to me.

Q: No, I don't think we need to quote it or repeat it here, but we simply do want to make obvious in this account that your views are available in Congressional testimony and certainly would not be hinged upon one supposed conversation with those fellows.

KUBISCH: In fact, some references if you wish them, are as follows: On September 20th, 1973, I testified on the United States and Chile during the Allende years, 1970-73, Government Printing Office #39180, Washington, 1975, page 97. And again, on September 25th, 1973, before a classified session, which has since been released and published.

Q: Well, we both know how small and not so small errors can become enshrined in the record.

KUBISCH: Well, I think it's a great pity and it demonstrated to me more clearly than anything in my entire Foreign Service career, how important it is to deal with the big misrepresentation, an important misrepresentation, promptly, with the truth. It's like Hitler's big lie, you had to deal with it with the big truth, frontally and immediately, if you didn't want it to become established as an historical truth.

Q: Well, that's an interesting side light. I want to return now for the sake of shedding light on operational questions in a large embassy. I want to return to your comments about your representations that you had to make to Alphand in the Quai d'Orsay. You're sitting there as chargé and you get an instruction from the Department of State, in the form of a telegram and the telegram reads, you will convey to the highest appropriate authority such and such. What do you do then?

KUBISCH: Well, such a thing happened with me many times in Paris. I can think of an example. I went to my office in the morning and there was an instruction. I would say it was in early 1972, I don't recall the exact date. I suppose we could look it up.

I got into my office in the morning and there was a long overnight, urgent, telegram from the State Department, signed by the Secretary of State, with his name at the bottom. It said, "For the Chargé from the Secretary" and instructed me to see the highest appropriate level in the French Government and protest a conference that the French Government proposed to permit in France.

This was during a very important and crucial period of the Vietnam peace talks. The French Government had agreed to maintain a neutral and impartial atmosphere in and around Paris, in which those talks could take place, among the Americans and Vietnamese parties.

Word had gotten out that there was going to be a conference in Versailles of an international body, with representatives of Communist parties from all around the world and other groups who were opposed to American policy and actions in Vietnam. This conference was going to be attended by many hundreds, perhaps even several thousand people, and as you know, Henry, Versailles is really on the outskirts of Paris, not very far away.

So I was instructed to protest this. It was certainly going to lead to large scale demonstrations against our embassy and against the talks in Paris. We had many of them while I was there in the embassy.

I went in and I requested an appointment to see the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for France, known as "the Quai d'Orsay."

Q: For the record, what do you do to get an appointment with the Secretary General of the Quai d'Orsay and then how do you get into see him? Treat me as if I'm feebleminded.

KUBISCH: Well, what I do is call my assistant in, who is a good French speaker, and we sit down and we look at the calendar, and I say, you know, I've got this instruction. Should I go and try and see the President of France? No. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, Schuman? No. Should I go and see the Secretary General, the number two man, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs? Hervé Alphand, who had been the French ambassador in Washington during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations? Probably. Should I drop a level below him to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs? No. Alphand's the man.

So I said, "Call Alphand's office, tell him that Minister Kubisch, the chargé of the American Embassy, has an instruction to see him at his earliest convenience." So my assistant goes and calls and arranges the appointment. He knows my schedule and works out a time and late that afternoon, I have the appointment with Alphand.

I go in. Now, at that time I spoke fairly good French. I was qualified at the 3-3 level in the Foreign Service, which is the professional level, but Alphand spoke English much better than I spoke French. Even so, although he would speak English with me at parties or at dinners or something like that, in his office and in the Quai d'Orsay we always spoke French. He insisted on it. It was fine with me.

So I went in and made my representation. I had prepared an aide-mémoire, as you know an aide-mémoire is a piece of paper you prepare to aid the memory, that summarized the points of our protest. And I went in and I made my representations to Secretary General Alphand. I told him what our reasoning was, why we disagreed with the French Government in permitting this conference to take place. And as an aide-mémoire, I handed him this document, which is not an official document or of position, but to assist him in recalling exactly what I had said.

Q: Incidentally, I might comment here, bearing in mind now that I'm feebleminded for the moment. The aide-mémoire is something typed up by your secretary before you leave, from the text of the telegram, right?

KUBISCH: Yes, exactly. I sort of lift from the telegram those paragraphs or sentences, of my instruction that can be conveyed to the representative of the other government. Not the whole instruction, obviously, with all the background and so on.

So, I gave that to Alphand. He looked at it, he read it, he listened to me, and he said, "Thank you very much," very formally. He was very formal, "Mr. Minister, I must say that I don't believe that the French Government will agree to cancel this conference but we will certainly give it careful consideration and thought, and I will discuss it with the Minister and appropriate authorities in the French Government and be back in touch with you as quickly as possible."

I said, "Thank you, Mr. Secretary General."

And then he said, "Are we finished now with the formal part of this visit?"

And I said, "As far as I am concerned, we are."

So he said, "Well, let me tell you something. I think you'll find it amusing."

The aide-mémoire contained words to this effect, "Everyone in the world will know that Versailles is on the outskirts of Paris and knows how important Versailles is and knows that such a conference would tend to compromise the neutrality and impartiality of the Vietnam negotiations in Paris."

So Alphand went on personally in saying, "I just want you to know something that you may find amusing because I don't agree that everybody in the United States or elsewhere knows where Versailles is or would attach that much importance to a conference in Versailles." He said, "When I was ambassador in Washington, I got a request from the Mayor of Versailles, who said that we were going to have in France the celebration of the 500th anniversary of the founding of Versailles, and he wanted to invite mayors of Versailles, towns by that name, all over the world to come and participate in the celebration."

Alphand went on to say that as ambassador in Washington, he had his associates in the embassy investigate and they found, I believe, eleven towns in the U.S. by the name of Versailles, as they are pronounced in the United States. So Alphand, as the French ambassador, sent an invitation to all the mayors of them to go to Paris and participate in this great celebration in Versailles.

He said he would never forget the letter he got back from one mayor, I think it was the mayor of a town by the name of Versailles in Texas, but I'm not positive. The mayor said, "Dear Ambassador Alphand, thank you for the invitation and please convey my thanks to the Mayor of Versailles in France. I'd love to be able to go but I can't. But I do appreciate the invitation and I want you to know that I and the people of Versailles, here in my state, are just delighted to know that there is another town by that name in France."

Q: That's good. That reminds me of the statistic, I'm not sure exactly what it is, but something like 83% of all Americans think New Mexico is a foreign country.

KUBISCH: Yes, something like that.

Q: Alphand told you this in French?

KUBISCH: He told me this in French.

Q: And so you didn't get very far on that particular approach?

KUBISCH: No, the conference was held in Versailles, but it was very carefully monitored and to protect the security of the talks, no permission was given for any demonstration or parade or anything into Paris. Typical Gallic solution to a problem like this.

Q: France, not too long before, of course, had had it's own great difficulties with Indochina. Perhaps it was just as neutral as possible because they had totally withdrawn from the whole scene in 1954. Do we know why Paris was chosen as the site for these negotiations?

KUBISCH: Well, they were chosen long before I went to Paris and I think an effort was made to find a site that was acceptable to all the parties. And Paris offered the facilities.

I had the impression that others were available. Perhaps Geneva or elsewhere, but I am sure there has been lots of published information on that.

Q: Can you talk to us now on a point that you mentioned a little while ago about the resignation of Ambassador Watson?

KUBISCH: Well, yes, I would like to say a word about that because I think he was much maligned in that. As I recall, after President Nixon visited Shanghai and the Shanghai Communiqué was released, it was decided subsequently between the Governments in Peking, now Beijing, and Washington, that a Paris channel would be opened for contacts between the two Governments. Earlier the contacts had been in Warsaw. And they were not as public or official. This was to be the official opening of an official channel of contact between the two Governments.

Q: In Warsaw, I recall, Walter Stoessel was the person who conducted the negotiations.

KUBISCH: He did. So it was agreed this would take place in Paris, between a very high ranking official of the Chinese government, Ambassador Huang, who was sent to Paris, and Ambassador Watson, the American ambassador, would handle them for the United States. This had not been released publicly yet, that Paris would be the site and channel.

One evening after I had gone home from the embassy, about 7 or 8 o'clock at night, I got a call from Ambassador Watson. He had just had a message from Washington, from Secretary of State Rogers, instructing him, Watson, to come back to Washington as quickly as possible. There was going to be an announcement in the White House about 36 hours later, of the opening of the Paris channel, and they wanted to brief Watson and have him present for that. This was about March or April of 1972, I think.

Ambassador Watson went back to the embassy to try and arrange transportation to go as quickly as possible. As I recall, he told me this subsequently, he went back to the embassy. His executive assistant, John Clark, was there. Watson, by this time it was about dinnertime, had a couple of scotches, I recall him telling me later. He tried to get

transportation to get back to Washington as quickly as possible, had difficulty and finally got a military plane to take him a few hours later from Paris to London, where he was able to get on a Pan Am flight and go onto New York and Washington the next morning.

In the meantime, he lay down on the sofa in his office and I think Clark covered him up with a blanket, and he tried to get some rest before beginning his trip.

He got on the military plane later that evening, went to London, got on the plane the next morning to go to New York on a Pan Am flight. Maybe it was then, he hadn't slept much that night, he said, maybe it was then that he had his scotches on the plane. But he had also taken a sleeping pill, he told me, to try and get some rest.

He said the combination of the sleeping pill and the drinks made him woozy and not feeling well. So he loosened his tie and put his seat back and tried to put his feet up, he was in the first class section I think, on the seat in front of him. He said that a stewardess came by and told him that that was not the way for an American ambassador to sit or look and did it in some kind of manner that irritated Ambassador Watson. And he apparently said some words to her about minding her own business or something, that she didn't know what was going on or what he had been through during the evening and the night before.

This led to some kind of intermittent exchange between the stewardess and Ambassador Watson, during the course of the flight. And when she arrived in New York, she filed a written report.

Watson went onto Washington and was at the ceremony with President Nixon and Secretary Rogers, announcing the Paris channel for the opening of the talks. A couple of days later excerpts from the Pan Am report appeared in the Jack Anderson column.

It was circulated all over and was repeated to France. And it proved to be a big embarrassment to Ambassador Watson, and to some extent the White House.

So I just wanted to clarify that story and give, to the best of my recollection, Ambassador Watson's account of what happened. He departed France soon after that but did not resign immediately, as I recall. He came back to Paris for visits and so on but didn't resign until the following September or so.

Q: Did you believe Watson?

KUBISCH: Yes.

Q: Before we get off on the rest of your career, other major parts of your career, let's wind up. Let's pull together the pieces on your tenure as Assistant Secretary in the Department.

You had to deal with President Nixon. You had to deal with Henry Kissinger, etc., at that high level. I understand you have some comments now that might be of interest.

KUBISCH: Well, I thought you might be interested in knowing how I happened to be assigned to that job when I was in Paris, and some light I might be able to shed on that period in terms of
Dr. Henry Kissinger's assignment as Secretary of State soon thereafter.

As I mentioned, I was the chargé d'affaires in our embassy in Paris for many months beginning about in the summer of 1972 through the early months of 1973. As you will recall, this was a very important period, both in terms of U.S.-French bilateral relationships and the negotiations leading to the Vietnam Peace Conference in January of 1973. These negotiations were taking place in Paris during that time. Also there was the election campaign in November of 1972, President Nixon's reelection as President.

So there was a lot going on and there was a steady stream of visits to Paris during this period of various senior U.S. Government officials, including many Cabinet officials, and frequent and repeated visits by Dr. Henry Kissinger and several by Secretary of State Rogers. I played a role in helping to arrange for the Vietnam Peace Conference in Paris in January of 1973.

As a result my close work with senior U.S. Government officials, both from the White House and the State Department and elsewhere, at one time during those winter months of November and December, 1972, Henry Kissinger got me aside to say that President Nixon wanted me to come back to Washington and occupy a key position in his second term. Kissinger said he had been authorized on behalf of the President and Secretary of State Rogers to explore with me the possibility of a couple of senior positions in the State Department. As it narrowed down, there were two positions that were discussed with me. One, as an Assistant Secretary of State for one of the regional bureaus, and the other as Counselor of the Department.

Now over a period of some talks and some weeks, during which I explained to Kissinger that I'd really hoped upon conclusion of my assignment in Paris to go as an ambassador, as a chief of mission, as I had hoped to do originally after leaving Mexico before going to Paris as the Deputy Chief of Mission. He made it clear to me, as I knew, that the position of Assistant Secretary of State or Counselor of the Department, certainly Assistant Secretary, was a more important position than many ambassadorships that I might be considered for. He said he had special reasons for wanting me to come back to Washington that would become clear to me in due course.

Q: He wouldn't tell you then?

KUBISCH: No, he did not tell me then. This was about in, I guess, December of '72 and January of '73 approximately. So I agreed to go back as Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America if they wanted me to. I say "agreed" to go back. Naturally, I would go. I

was a Foreign Service officer committed to worldwide assignments, prepared to accept them anywhere. But I made the request that at the first good opportunity I be considered for a post abroad as a chief of mission. Both Kissinger and Secretary of State Rogers assured me personally that would be the case.

So I went back as Assistant Secretary of State. I got back, I guess I left Paris in early April, 1973, returned to Washington just before the weekend on a Friday or Saturday and was invited to the White House for a religious service and a breakfast on Sunday morning. I think it was April 17th, but I'm not sure. The reason I remember it was because at that breakfast and at that service there were a small number of people there and President Nixon came over to me. I had met him on a few occasions and he knew who I was. As a matter of fact, he said he wanted to welcome me back. He was looking forward to my taking over as Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America. He felt that there were a lot of problems down there. He doubled up his fist and he hit me in the chest, kind of a halfhearted punch, a half-way punch, and said, "Jack, I want you to take as much time as you need to straighten out those problems in Latin America for me." He said, "Take two weeks, if you want to!"

But that particular morning, that Sunday morning, I also saw Richard Kleindienst the White House. He had not actually attended the church service or the breakfast. He had come to see President Nixon following those. I did know Kleindienst, as I mentioned earlier, when he was Deputy Attorney General working on the drug problem with our embassy in Mexico where I was assigned at the time. Kleindienst and I had come to know each other fairly well. He told me he was there to see the President on a very important and private matter. I was only to learn subsequently that it was at that very meeting that he had with Nixon that he reported to him about the discussion the night before with John Dean on the Watergate problems.

Q: But even looking back it does not appear to you now that President Nixon was particularly perturbed about Watergate developments?

KUBISCH: I don't think so. There was no indication of it to me at that time. I think there were very few people at that time who had any sense of the seriousness and the proportion that this crisis would subsequently come to have.

Q: This is in October of '73?

KUBISCH: No, this was in April of '73 that this meeting took place.

Q: The previous fall, no one paid any attention to it at all.

KUBISCH: I guess not. I guess it wasn't really known during then. Although, from my point of view, in Paris, there was an almost frantic pace to try to bring the Vietnam War to a conclusion before the election day of November. Kissinger and others were back and forth almost weekly, and all kinds of instructions were flying back and forth.

Q: You may know that there's scholarship now that indicates that Kissinger was frantic but that Nixon pulled the rug out from under him because Kissinger was getting a little too popular and a little too prominent himself. And so it had to be eventually announced that peace is right around the corner or something of that sort.

KUBISCH: Peace is at hand, yes.

Q: Just out of curiosity, before we move on to anything else, why was the embassy in Paris without an ambassador for so long?

KUBISCH: I think we discussed in our last meeting the resignation of Ambassador Watson. As I recall, the Pan Am incident played a major role in bringing about his resignation, although it happened earlier in 1972. He was the nominal ambassador, I think, until about September, 1972, although he was gone from Paris much of that time. And apparently Secretary Rogers and President Nixon saw no need or point in naming a new ambassador in the fall of '72 just on the eve of the election but thought they would do so subsequently. The new ambassador was named, as I recall, in early 1973. I think they also felt that I was in charge of the embassy and competent to handle it. So I was chargé for quite a few months there.

One of the points I wanted to make was, the following August, in August of '73, President Nixon named Henry Kissinger to become Secretary of State. There was a lot of surprise about that because Secretary of State Rogers had continued on into the early months of the second Nixon Administration. I saw Kissinger often during that period because that was also during the weeks of Allende's overthrow in Chile and there were a lot of other things going on in Latin America while I was Assistant Secretary. Secretary Rogers left the post as Secretary of State and a man by the name of Kenneth Rush, was Acting Secretary for some months. Deputy Secretary Rush had not had much experience in Latin America, so I was dealing directly and often with Kissinger and the White House and others on Latin American problems for several months after Rogers left.

When Kissinger was confirmed as Secretary in late September, he went to New York to the U.N. where Secretaries of State usually go every year for the annual meeting of the General Assembly. We had arranged a meeting for the new Secretary of State Henry Kissinger with the Latin American Foreign Ministers at a lunch at the Center for Inter-American Relations on Park Avenue in New York during the General Assembly, when all the Foreign Ministers of Latin American Governments pretty much were in New York.

As Secretary Kissinger and I were riding to that luncheon meeting, he said something to me that shed some light on my appointment as Assistant Secretary for Latin America earlier, some months prior. As we were going to the luncheon meeting, we were in the back of his car, and we had the glass up between us and the driver. We were talking privately. He said that as Secretary of State and as a friend of mine he wanted to talk to

me about the post as Ambassador in Mexico. Our Ambassador there had resigned and was ill and was to be replaced. The post was vacant. He said that the Foreign Minister of Mexico, a man by the name of Emilio Rabasa, had gotten in touch with him, Kissinger, personally to suggest to Kissinger and through Kissinger to President Nixon, that he and President Echeverria of Mexico would welcome my assignment as Ambassador to Mexico. I had known them both well and worked with them both well, Echeverria when he was Attorney General of Mexico. Kissinger said to me if I really wanted to go, if it had been sort of a lifelong ambition of mine to be Ambassador to Mexico--he knew that he had a commitment to me to propose me for an ambassadorship-- then he would propose it to President Nixon. But if it was not a burning desire of mine, he would appreciate my staying on as Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America because, as I knew, he was just coming to the State Department. He knew very little about Latin America. (In fact, I think his best-known comment about Latin America was one he'd made at a press conference once about "South America is a dagger pointed at the heart of Antarctica!") He confessed he really didn't know much about Latin America, and he would appreciate it if I'd stay on with him as Secretary of State for some months because he knew and trusted me. He wanted to have a series of meetings with me and my staff in the Latin American Division of the State Department (which we did have subsequently two or three times a week with him for about three months and which he called the "Kubisch Tutorials," as we were helping Kissinger learn about the issues and problems in the countries of Latin America). But he said he'd like for me to stay on and, following that, see him through a meeting of Foreign Ministers of Latin America to be held in Mexico in February of 1974. He then would release me for the first good ambassadorial assignment that came along.

So I concluded at that time that one of the reasons that I was in the State Department as Assistant Secretary was because Henry Kissinger had known some months before that he was to become Secretary of State and Bill Rogers, the Secretary at the time, also had made arrangements to leave. This had all been prearranged for Kissinger, really, to place some people that he knew and trusted in the State Department in key positions for the second Nixon Administration. I could be wrong in that. He's never said that to me. But I just came to that conclusion.

Q: So this would place it six months in advance?

KUBISCH: I would say so. I would say that my feeling now is that he probably knew in early 1973 that he was to replace Secretary Rogers later, some six months later, but not at the outset of the second Nixon term. I could be wrong on that, but that's my feeling at the moment.

Q: Early '73?

KUBISCH: Yes, in early '73 Kissinger probably knew and may definitely have known that he was going to Secretary of State later that year.

Q: The following year, in September of '74 you arrived in Greece?

KUBISCH: Right.

Q: Is there some further windup now that we need to do on the ARA position, or can I ask you at this point what led to your assignment in Greece?

KUBISCH: Well, I'll say one thing more and then we'll move on to Greece, if you wish. We had a meeting of Foreign Ministers of the United States and the Latin American and Caribbean countries in February of 1974. It was a very important meeting. It was to implement something which came to be known during that period as the "New Dialogue" between the U.S. Government and the countries of the hemisphere. It was to be a very important watershed conference.

A lot of preparation was done. As I say, Henry Kissinger, himself, met with me and my immediate staff two or three times a week for, I would guess, ten or twelve weeks prior to that conference for an hour or an hour and a half. We went over each of the subjects and each of the countries and each of the issues in much detail. He really did his utmost to learn as much as he could because during the three days of the conference in February he spoke basically just from notes. But he demonstrated so much knowledge, understanding and grasp of the problems of the hemisphere that he made a marvelous impression on the Latin Americans, the Foreign Ministers and government leaders there, which was one of the goals of the United States in this conference.

As I was the Deputy Chief of the U.S. Delegation, he was the chief, I was named along with others of comparable rank to negotiate the communique to be released at the end of that conference in Mexico. Let's see, the date was about February 23 or 24, 1974. We had a draft ready, based on my earlier experiences with Harriman, as we discussed the last time we were together. We had a draft of a communique ready to go and already cleared within the U.S. Government and with Henry Kissinger before we ever arrived at the conference. We presented it and spent almost 24 hours continuously, morning, noon and night, about the second and third days of the conference, negotiating the communique that was to be released.

Basically the U.S. position and what Kissinger wanted the communique to say was that things were once again going along very well between the United States and Latin America, there was great rapport, great understanding, the conference had been a great success, and while there were some problems and issues to be resolved, working groups were being established to deal with them, and all in all to portray a new era of good feeling and good neighborliness between Washington and the Latin American countries.

Most of the Latin American governments did not wish to accept this approach. They wanted to keep the pressure on the United States to do certain things for them, to make certain commitments to them, to assist them economically, to make commitments about refraining from various kinds of intervention in their internal affairs, to give them benefits

and access to U.S. markets, and so on. So there was a lot of negotiation, some of it very heated, and very, very limited negotiating room.

During this negotiation, I would have to check with Kissinger every hour or two during the conference itself, during the evening of the banquet, during the night when he was asleep. I woke him up during the night, I suppose two or three times, to say we cannot get this point through with this language, but they will buy such and such language if you will authorize me to agree to it, some kind of a compromise between what they wanted and what we wanted. Kissinger was adamant. All through this he refused to make almost any kind of concession or to compromise whatsoever.

And so, by the morning of the last day when the conference was to have ended, we still had no agreed communique. All of the negotiators had complained to their Foreign Ministers about how Assistant Secretary Kubisch was just absolutely uncompromising on any of these issues, and that he was being very obstinate and difficult, and so on. So some of the Foreign Ministers went to Kissinger and said, "Can't you get someone else in there that will negotiate a favorable communique?" And Kissinger faked complete surprise. He was astonished that I had been so difficult to get along with. I had to smile to myself at all this because he was the one who was giving me my very explicit instructions through it all. But to make a long story short, he arranged to make certain concessions and compromises that led to the communique finally being issued. He later said to me he was sorry to make me "the fall guy" on all this, but I certainly understood that that's the way that Secretaries of State and their subordinates should work in dealing with foreign officials.

Q: I have two questions on that. How was it that he instructed you not to make any concessions without clearing with him? What was his language and what was his manner, the mode of telling you this? The second question I will ask you to address is, once he got around to being the guy making certain concessions, how much did he give away?

KUBISCH: To answer your first question, I should say that the communique, which consisted of several pages, was one that both Kissinger and I knew virtually by heart. We knew all the articles in it, all the sentences in it, all the key phrases in it, which were so loaded with certain meaning to certain people and to certain governments. And we had hammered out this communique, as I say, in a final draft before we ever left Washington to go to Mexico. We had anticipated resistance and problems, particularly from the Mexicans on one part, from the Brazilians on another, and from the Colombians and the Venezuelans on still another, and so on. So we knew what the problems were and where the difficulties would arise. Basically, I would go to him, as I say, during the day or in the evening or during the night and say that on Article III, phrase so and so of three, four or five words, was not acceptable. We could not get a consensus on that. But if we agree to change a certain word or a certain order of the words or a couple of words, we could get agreement; and he would say, "No, don't do it."

Q: The communique will be a matter of record and we can look that up. That's not what I mean exactly. Did he tell you explicitly in advance you were to make no changes whatever without checking with me?

KUBISCH: I don't recall instructions that explicit. But I should tell you that he had worked so closely on that draft with me and my colleagues in the State Department that I knew from hours and days and weeks of previous discussions what was important to him and what was not. So there was no question in my mind. He didn't have to say, "Don't agree to a change in this phrase." I knew when a phrase arose that was crucial and critical to him that I could not change it because he would not approve it. He would not agree to it without my checking with him. I guess, to answer your question, my working relationship with him was so close and so intimate and I knew his thinking so well that I knew where I had authority to change and where I did not.

Q: How much did he end up giving away?

KUBISCH: He ended up giving away, really, very little in terms of substance. But in terms of general public acceptability in the Latin American countries, he made concessions on key words and key phrases that would make it possible for the governments in power in those countries to go back say that they had brought home to the American officials at this conference their concerns about A, B and C, and look at the communique there and the acknowledgment and recognition by the Americans that they were going to try and do something about these problems. So it was more appearance than substance that was given away.

Q: As everyone knows, appearance in diplomacy is often nearly as important as substance. That was in February of '74?

KUBISCH: That's correct.

Q: It marked the culmination of a teaching effort on your part and a learning effort on Kissinger's part and a successful pulling together of experience to be utilized by a new Secretary of State. From that point on, though, he was in a position to let you go to the field.

KUBISCH: Well, within a reasonable period of time. I think he knew the East-West problems very, very well. He spent a lifetime really studying, working, talking, teaching and reciting about them. But he did not know a great deal about Latin America when he became Secretary of State. He had never been anywhere in Latin America, as I recall, except to Mexico. I think he may have made one trip to Brazil or stopped at Brazil once for a day. But he knew very little about the problems of Latin America and the Caribbean.

As a result of this conference, in the period from October of '73 through February of '74, he became very knowledgeable. He's a very bright man and a thorough, hard-working man who needs very little sleep, does very little drinking or very little recreation. While

he was Secretary of State he learned a tremendous amount. In the period which followed this conference, from February through the spring and summer, there was never an issue that I recall that came up that he wasn't immediately able to deal with as Secretary of State.

Q: What at that time was the principle issue facing the U.S. within our Latin American relations?

KUBISCH: Well, there was a feeling fairly widespread throughout Latin America that the first Nixon Administration, the '68-'72 or January of '69 to January '73 period, had been one which Latin Americans would have characterized U.S. policy as one of neglect, disinterest. Maybe it was benign but they felt that by being neglectful we were becoming malignant, that during this period the Alliance For Progress had been allowed to languish, U.S. economic and other kinds of assistance to Latin America and to Latin American countries in world meetings, had languished. The preoccupation of the Nixon Government and Dr. Kissinger seemed to be in East-West problems, with NATO, and with Western Europe, and the Warsaw Pact, and the Soviet Union, and with Southeast Asia and the Vietnam War. And, I think, the countries of Latin America really felt that they didn't have friends in Washington high in the Administration who knew their problems and who would listen to them. In the meantime, their own countries' economies and political situations had been deteriorating. So they wanted a renewed, close dialogue and working relationship with the second Nixon Administration and with top officials in the U.S. Government. Kissinger came forward to provide that.

Q: So there were a myriad of problems that they had and the Latin American ministers felt at this particular time, looking back on it, that they simply weren't getting enough attention from the United States, benevolent attention from the United States, and they wanted that rectified. So that was the single biggest issue at the time you were Assistant Secretary.

KUBISCH: Well, I wouldn't say that. I wouldn't put it quite that way. I would say that was the context in which many big issues arose. For example, we negotiated the Panama Canal Treaty during that period, the last year I was Assistant Secretary and the first year that Kissinger was Secretary of State. That was a very big issue in Latin America and in the United States. There was the overthrow of the government of Allende, and the feeling in Latin America was that the United States was deeply involved in bringing about his downfall and in intervening and interfering in the internal processes. There were all kinds, a wide range, of very serious economic problems. There had been a diminution of U.S. economic assistance within the framework of the Alliance for Progress. So there were very, very many important and very big issues. But it was in this context that I described that these issues arose and were dealt with.

Q: Well, I phrased it poorly calling it a myriad of problems. Some of them were obviously much more important than others.

KUBISCH: But I think most of those are well covered in texts and in other published material that we need not dwell on anymore at this time unless you wish.

Q: How did you choose Athens or how did Athens choose you?

KUBISCH: It turned out that in July of 1974, while I was Assistant Secretary, the then Greek military government endeavored to cooperate with Greek Cypriots on the Island of Cyprus, to overthrow the Government of President and Archbishop Makarios on Cyprus, to assassinate him, and for a group of Greek Cypriots to take control of Cyprus and unite Cyprus with Greece. This led to a crisis and a near war between Greece and Turkey. It led to the fall of the military regime in Greece that had been there for seven years, and the reassignment of the American Ambassador in Greece, Ambassador Tasca, who had been so closely associated with the regime of the Greek colonels. When this happened, and a near war was about to break out, Kissinger and I were talking about it and I informed him that I knew a very prominent, perhaps the most prominent, civilian statesman in modern Greece, a man by the name of Constantine Karamanlis, who had been recalled to Greece in late July in 1974 to reassume the prime minister ship of the country after he had been in voluntary exile for ten years in Paris.

Kissinger asked me if I had any interest in going to Greece as ambassador, and I said, "Yes, I would" in line with earlier conversations that we had had. I said, "I would welcome such an assignment." And he said that he would talk to the President about it. The matter dragged on for a couple of weeks because these were the final days and weeks of the Nixon Administration leading to President Nixon's resignation on Friday, August 9, 1974, almost at the height of the crisis between Greece and Turkey. Kissinger called me that day and said he had spoken to President Ford and President Ford was prepared to name me as ambassador to Greece and would I come to the White House. Nixon resigned at Noon on Friday, August 9th and about 5:00 p.m. that afternoon I was at the White House privately with our new President Ford and Secretary Kissinger talking about the Greek-Turkish problem.

President Ford, whom I had known fairly well as a congressman and as Vice President, called me by my first name, "Jack, Henry tells me that you're willing to go to Athens as our ambassador. Is that right?" And I said, "Yes, I would welcome the assignment." He said, "All right, that settles it. You can go."

Kissinger asked me to propose candidates to replace myself as Assistant Secretary of State: two from the Foreign Service, one in the State Department at the time and one abroad, and one not in the State Department or the Foreign Service. These were his requirements, give me three names of who you think your successor should be, which over the coming days I did, and he finally selected one.

But I should tell you that I think I was President Ford's first appointment after he became President because the request for agreement went out to the Greek Government over the weekend. The following Monday evening, I think it was August 12th, I was in the White

House at a reception, or maybe it was the 13th, Tuesday the 13th because Ambassador Rodger Davies, our ambassador in Nicosia, Cyprus had been assassinated earlier that day, and there was a tremendous upheaval going on in Greece and in Cyprus, lots of problems. President Ford, very considerately I thought, to both my wife and me, came over and said, "Jack, I heard about Ambassador Davies in Cyprus being murdered earlier today. I know Athens is a very dangerous post. If you have second thoughts about going out there" he said, "I'd be willing to try and find somebody else to take the assignment." I said no and did go in September, 1974.

Q: You had known Karamanlis?

KUBISCH: I had known Karamanlis in Paris while he was in exile.

Q: In what capacity?

KUBISCH: In a democratic society or country it's very well advised for American officials and ambassadors and chargés and diplomats to maintain contacts with key leaders of opposition parties who may someday come back to power. So, for example, I used to meet with President, or at that time the head of the Socialist Party, Mitterrand in France, even though Pompidou was President of the country. And in that context, I was under instructions from time to time from Washington to meet with Constantine Karamanlis who had been Prime Minister of Greece and gone into voluntary exile. So from time to time I would send other officers from the embassy to go and discuss world matters with him and explain U.S. policies and just show him some courtesies. That's how I had come to know him.

Q: Take him to lunch?

KUBISCH: I don't think I ever had lunch with him in Paris.

Q: From April through September, 1974 in Greece there were, at least from time to time, mass demonstrations going on. Was that a problem when you arrived on the scene?

KUBISCH: It was a problem, the dimensions of which I cannot exaggerate. I'll tell you why. Actually the military regime in Greece continued until July 22, 1974 and that's when the demonstrations started. Greece and Turkey almost went to war. There was a great humiliation in Greece over what had happened in Cyprus, the fact that the Turks had landed there. There was a widespread feeling in Greece that all of the problems of Greece, the problems that Greece had with Turkey, the problems Greece had on Cyprus, the oppression and repression the people of Greece had suffered for seven years under the colonels, the Greek colonels, the military dictatorship, that the responsible party for all of this was the U.S. Government. And, as a result, they began tremendous demonstrations against the U.S. Embassy and against the United States Government.

It might be interesting to recall why they had this impression. My feeling when I arrived in Greece, as to why they felt this way, was because that for seven years, from 1967 to '74, the Greek Government was kind of a pariah among western democracies. The governments of Western Europe, the democratic governments, had virtually nothing to do with Greece during those seven years. No important leader of any country visited Greece while the colonels were in power during those seven years. But the exception was the United States. The Vice President of the United States, Spiro Agnew, made an official visit to Greece. The Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, made an official visit to Greece. The Secretary of Commerce, Maurice Stans, made an official visit to Greece. Our top NATO commanders and American military commanders repeatedly made important official visits to Greece during this military regime. And whenever they were there, the Greek Government, the military government, exploited these visits as fully as they could with newspapers, with stories, with photographs and everything. There came to be in the minds of the Greek people a feeling that the United States Government was the one friend these military leaders of Greece had and that the U.S. was only interested in Greece because of our military bases there and that the CIA basically was carrying to the Greek military instructions as to what to do. Therefore, the Greek people felt that we were responsible for the disaster on Cyprus, for the Turkish troop landings on Cyprus, and for the major problems the country faced at that time.

On demonstrations I would just say that I've seen many demonstrations in my life. I saw the demonstrations in the 60s in Washington where 50,000 or 100,000 people would demonstrate. I saw them in Brazil in the early 60s when there were 100,000 people in the streets of Sao Paulo and Rio and Brasilia. And even during the Vietnam Peace Accords, our embassy in Paris was attacked several times by 10,000, 20,000 or 30,000 people in the Place de la Concorde. We were well protected by the French authorities, fortunately.

But I had never seen demonstrations of the kind that took place in Athens. There were demonstrations of 200,000, 300,000 or 400,000 people that gathered in the center of town all day long and then marched on the American Embassy, 200 to 300 abreast, marching by, using the worst, most obscene epithets in language, and trying to break into the embassy. They did succeed in breaking into the embassy once, tried to set it on fire and did over $100,000 worth of damage. It was really a period of great turbulence in Greece and deep, bitter anti-American feelings.

Q: What year was this that they managed to break into the embassy?

KUBISCH: They broke into the embassy in late 1974, as I recall. I arrived in September of '74 and we had word that . . .

Q: That was the first year you were there?

KUBISCH: It was, yes.

Q: What protection did Karamanlis offer at that time?

KUBISCH: To the embassy?

Q: Yes.

KUBISCH: Well, the Greek authorities tried to protect the embassy. For example, on the day the mob broke in, or the evening they broke in, we knew there was going to be a big gathering downtown and a march against the embassy. So about 4:00 in the afternoon I sent everybody home, and I left the embassy with the security officer, the American security officer and the Marine guards, and several others. And as the groups came by, they marched by, they got to the embassy at about 8:00 in the evening. By prearrangement they burned an American flag as a signal and then stormed the embassy. There were a couple of hundred Greek police surrounding the embassy as a barricade, and I had given the Marines instructions not to draw a pistol and shoot anyone because they were looking for a martyr, the demonstrators, the leaders of the demonstration, to try and bring on even more anti-American sentiment in the country.

I had told the Marines not to draw their pistols or shoot anyone unless, as we used to say in the Navy in World War II, you were in the last extremity where they had you down, they were about to do you terrible damage, then you could draw your pistol and shoot. And those Marines, we had twelve at the time in the Marine security guard, did a wonderful job. They fought off the people breaking into the embassy with brooms and fire extinguishers and chairs and so on. A lot of people were hurt. There were a lot of broken bones, broken arms, broken clavicles and so on. A lot of police were badly injured, but no one was killed.

Q: Let's see now, further into the violence at the embassy in Athens in late '74.

KUBISCH: I just wanted to say that I saw then, and this greatly influenced me as I endeavored to fashion U.S. posture and policy in Greece at the time, the terrible price the U.S. Government must pay when it associates itself so intimately, so publicly and so prominently with a repressive regime in another country. The damage to U.S. interests in that period and subsequently, in my view, flowed directly from unnecessary and short-sighted policies and actions during the previous several years.

So I decided that we would have to revamp our CIA station in Greece and its role there and follow a set of policies in the country, both publicly and behind the scenes, that would try and rectify what was a very severe and threatening situation to U.S. interests.

I might say further about that particular damage to the embassy, I was outraged when I saw all the damage that had been done, and I was determined it would never happen again. I didn't think it would happen, and the Greek authorities assured me they would not allow it to happen even once. The Minister of Defense, bless his heart, a man by the name of Averoff, came immediately to the embassy during the evening, this was about 10:00 in the evening, to express, on his behalf and on the part of Greek authorities, his great

sadness and sorrow about this attack on our embassy and the damage done to it. And the Foreign Minister, Dimitri Bitsios, called me on the telephone. He has since passed away. He expressed his regret on the phone and said that the Greek Government would pay the expense of repairing the embassy, which they did.

This led, by the way, to a big issue between our embassy and Washington as to what should be done to prevent this in the future because the embassy building had been designed by a famous architect, Gropius. It was built on kind of a small hillside. It was kind of a modern-day building along the style of the Acropolis and the Parthenon on the Acropolis. It was a beautiful building with no fences or anything around it. I decided we were going to have to put a fence around the embassy. I hated to do it, but I decided we would have to put a fence around it. Some of the people in the embassy said, "Oh, the Greek people will never understand this. They'll think that this fence is going to be a barricade and symbolic of problems between Greece and the United States." But we did end up putting a fence around it, a very high fence with spikes on top and putting shrubbery around it to disguise it to make sure that no one was ever injured again by an attack on that embassy.

This was, of course, in '74, long before we had the kinds of security problems that subsequently became so serious to our diplomats and our establishments abroad.

Q: That one instance of the break-in at the embassy, did they get through to the inner sanctum, the code room?

KUBISCH: No, they did not. They broke into the section of the embassy that was closest to the main thoroughfare that went by the embassy and only on the ground floor. That was the consular section. They did a tremendous amount of damage in there, broke windows and furniture and tried to overturn file cabinets and set fire. They were only in the building for about 30 minutes before they were driven out. But they never got into any important classified area.

Q: The Greek police drove them out?

KUBISCH: The Greek police drove them out and many Greek police were badly injured during this melee.

Q: Were any marines injured?

KUBISCH: No marines were seriously injured, only minor injuries.

Q: At the time, '74 early '75, the anti-American demonstrations continued. Your frame of mind at the time, were you inclined to think that the CIA had played an inappropriate role and was playing an inappropriate role in Greece operating out of the American Embassy?

KUBISCH: Yes, I did. My view on this is not shared, I'm sure, by many key officials in the CIA. But, I think, to understand it one needs to recall there was a terrible bitter civil war in the late 40s. There was an underground in Greece, and the CIA during the 40s, 50s and 60s became active in having close collaboration, intimate collaboration, with many key Greek leaders. The CIA, to some extent, it seemed to me, operated semi-independently from the ambassador and the embassy. I was never really sure at the outset that I knew whom they were seeing and what they were doing. I wanted to bring the CIA station under my control. So I felt, rightly or wrongly, that CIA had never really modernized in Greece to the kind of CIA station that existed in the other countries of Western Europe that I was familiar with, and in the countries of Latin America. They were still sort of operating the way they had operated 15 or 20 years earlier, and this was no longer appropriate. So it was at that time that I felt we would have to change the station and change its activities and to bring it more closely under my control and supervision.

Q: You were not always entirely sure you were seeing everything that was being sent out?

KUBISCH: No, because their instructions were to show me those things which they felt, either in Washington or in the local station, that I needed to see. Now they were constantly reassuring me that I saw everything important and knew everything important they were doing except "sources and methods." Obviously, only those that need to, know who their agents are by name or the methods they used to acquire intelligence. There was no need for me to know the details of that.

Q: You were there for several years, and presumably you brought the agency under control. How did you go about it?

KUBISCH: Well, I made my views known both to the State Department and CIA in Washington by sending messages.

Q: By cable?

KUBISCH: By cable, written messages of what I felt needed to be done. I requested that the then station chief, who was a very competent officer, be replaced. At my request he was replaced. A man was proposed to me to become station chief in Athens, who had been the CIA station chief in Peru that I had known, a man by the name of Richard Welch. He had been an undergraduate at Harvard, a classics major, spoke Greek, and I knew him to be a very, very fine person that I could work with. So when he was proposed to become my station chief, I accepted him with great pleasure.

Q: He was nominated in November and assassinated on the 23rd of December. At that time he was 46 years old. He was station chief and widely known locally as being CIA, even though he had been there only a short period of time. He was named as an agent in the English language Athens News on November 25th. Six others in the embassy were

named. What was your reaction at the time? How did you cope or deal with that? Did you try to do anything about it?

KUBISCH: It was a very serious problem. I was dismayed to learn that he had been identified even before his arrival in Greece. He had been identified also in a circular, I believe, that had been sent around to Greece and elsewhere where they kept track of CIA officers operating abroad in various U.S. embassies.

Q: There was a publication called "Counter Spies" that was being put out by Philip Agee at the time which had named him apparently in January and June of that year.

KUBISCH: I understand that's correct. He had been named. He was not really troubled by this. But I should say that the head of the CIA station in Greece had traditionally lived in a certain U.S. Government-owned residence.

Q: The same is true of other posts.

KUBISCH: Yes. We had in Greece some six or eight Government-owned residences, and the CIA station chief had lived in one. Needless to say, the Greek intelligence services and many Greeks who wanted to find out, and foreign intelligence services were able to identify the CIA station chief in Greece. It's not hard for them to identify him in almost any country of the world, I suppose. The difference in Greece was that it was highly publicized. So when he came to Greece, assigned to the political section ostensibly, my deputy chief of mission, Monty Stearns, and I had made arrangements for him to go into a different residence and to live in a different part of town, to try and help conceal who he was and to give him some cover.

I must say, that neither Welch nor his wife seemed to be at all concerned about this, not at all. After they looked at the house that we had selected for them before their arrival, and looked at other houses that were available, they finally decided to move into the same house that their predecessors had lived in, the CIA house. I reluctantly concurred in this and he moved in. As I recall, he was there for a few months in 1975 before his assassination. Seems to me he may have arrived in the summer of '75. I'm not positive. I don't remember the exact dates. But I know he was one of my tennis buddies, and we played tennis a number of times, while he was there, as partners. I liked him very much.

He cooperated with me in revamping the CIA station and its wide, deep and, in my view, unnecessary extent of operations in Greece. He cooperated with me in accomplishing this over a period of a few months before his death. I think that was one of the great pities. His death was a great personal, as well as a professional, tragedy for me, even to this day. I'll never overcome it. He was a true friend of Greece, a friend of U.S.-Greece cooperation, and he was cooperating with me in trying to bring about the kinds of CIA operations in Greece that were more appropriate to the modern era, the modern times.

But, to stay with this a moment longer, I invited him to my house, the Ambassador's residence, for a Christmas party. I thought it was December 22nd, it might have been December 23rd. We were having a reception with Greek music, Greek food and Greek dancing and probably had 100 to 200 people there. A number of Greek officials were present and a lot of embassy staff and the children from the embassy and the children of Greek officials whom we knew, including Ministers of the Government, as part of my program to try and establish more cordial and cooperative working relationships between Greek authorities and American officials there.

He and his wife left our residence that evening about 9:00 or 10:00, they got in a car, drove just a few blocks to the house he was living in. His wife told me later that evening that as they drove by their house the lights were out in the driveway and on the front porch. Had they been in Guatemala, she said, where they had once served, they would not have stopped. They would have stepped on the accelerator and kept going if the lights were out until they got to the local police precinct or back to the embassy. But they just didn't think in Athens that there was any real severe threat to them.

They drove into their driveway and stopped. Across the street there was a small car with four people in it. Three of them got out. One came to each side of the Welch's car, made Mrs. Welch and Dick Welch get out. They asked him to put his hands up, in Greek. He spoke Greek. He apparently, as he was putting his hands up, asked them what they wanted. They fired three slugs from a .45 into his chest and killed him. They got in the car and sped off.

Q: Terrible story. I was in Cairo at the time, and we were rather deeply shocked there when we heard it as well. A year later there was a press report that a Greek security police chief was killed in December of 1976, a year later. A ballistic test indicated that the pistol that killed this police chief, former Greek police chief, was the same gun that killed Welch, and that the organization involved was something called the "Revolutionary Organization of 17 November." Do you recall that?

KUBISCH: Yes, I do. I think there have been several other assassinations in Greece that have been traced to that same weapon. It is a political statement, in part, I think. The November 17th group was a group that had been protesting the military regime between '67 and '74, and the military regime reacted very harshly on November 17th. I think it was in 1973. I'm not positive of that date. So they established an organization to retaliate and they used this weapon. This was a political statement by them, murdering the chief of the CIA and other key Greeks and others who, for one reason or another, had been involved in oppressing Greek people or cooperating with American officials.

Q: In 1975, during your period of time there, in April, the U.S. and Greek governments jointly announced that the Sixth Fleet Base Agreement was going to be ended and that the U.S. air base at Athens Airport was going to be closed. What occasioned all of that?

KUBISCH: Well, when President Karamanlis came back as prime minister in July of '74, he took several steps in an effort to gain wide support among the Greek people. He announced Greece's withdrawal from the military command structure of NATO. Another was an announcement that Greece, the Greek Government, would insist on Americans withdrawing from military facilities in Greece and renegotiating any U.S. presence there. He took a number of steps that had a favorable reaction among the Greek people. So that announcement to which you refer had to do with the closing of American bases and plans to home port an American carrier and its support forces in Greece that had been underway for several years, a home port of a carrier group, battle group, in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Incidentally, Karamanlis told me once when we were talking about this and some of the steps he had taken in Greece, he said that many things had been written about him, Karamanlis, but there was one thing that was written about him of which he was more proud that anything else. And I said, "What was that, Mr. Prime Minister?" And he said, "De Gaulle had written in his memoirs that Constantine Karamanlis was the one man who could govern a nation of people who did not wish to be governed."

I should also mention that Karamanlis did not speak very good English. He spoke a little English. He spoke fair to poor French and, of course, Greek. Obviously, he was fluent in Greek, his native language. I went to Greece rather abruptly before I could really become competent in Greek. I studied it as much as I could before I left and every day with a tutor while I was there, and I began to acquire some facility in the language. But whenever Karamanlis and I were alone, we ended up speaking in all three languages, Greek, English and French as we were communicating with each other. In one way or another he would say, "Now, what you said was this and you meant that" and so on. In fact, at one point, I spent almost a day and a half with him alone, or virtually alone, as we dealt with another crisis in that part of the world which we might discuss at some point if you wish.

Q: Was that the Turkish question?

KUBISCH: Yes. It was a crisis between Greece and Turkey over the Aegean. I'd be glad to say a few words about this, if you wish, because I think it shows a role an ambassador can play in helping to avert a serious conflict and particularly this one, much of which has never been published. I can give you an insight into what really happened.

The fact is that there was a widespread movement in the United States to establish a Greek lobby in order to influence the American Government on policy toward Greece. The Greek Government itself was, of course, deeply involved with the Cyprus crisis, between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots and between Greece and Turkey. Perhaps even more serious, in the view of the Greek Government, were the problems in the Aegean Sea between Greece and Turkey because very basic strategic, economic, military and political interests of the Greek people and the Greek Government were at stake there.

It was, as I recall, in the summer of 1976 that the Turkish Government began a program that the Greek Government and the Greek people thought threatened their vital interests. This almost led to a war between the two countries. The first time had been over Cyprus in '74. This was the second time, the summer of '76.

The issue was basically that the Turkish Government was going to send out a scientific exploration ship to study the bottom of the Aegean Sea for mineral and oil deposits because oil had been discovered in the northern Aegean Sea bed. The Greek people and the Greek Government said they would not allow this to happen. It went to a basic dispute between the two countries over who had the rights to resources in the sea bed in the Aegean.

The Turkish Government took the position that Asia Minor had a continental shelf that went out from Turkey under the Aegean and that the mineral and sea bed rights belonged to Turkey because it was on their continental shelf. The Greek Government took the position that Greece and its 3,000 islands, many of which are in the Aegean, had their own continental shelves, that Greece was an archipelagic state. As a matter of fact, the word archipelago has its origin in the Greek words "above the sea," "islands above the sea."

The Turkish Government said the islands were mere protuberances on the Turkish continental shelf. The Greek Government took the position that the islands had their own continental shelves around them and that if the Turkish Government sent this ship out, it was called the "Seismic", Greek naval vessels would intercept and take it under control and bring it back to a Greek port. The Turkish Government said if the Greek Government did that, they would be fired on and the Turkish Government would send ships out to protect the research vessel.

Over a period of some weeks, the issue got hotter and hotter, and tensions and emotions rose on both sides of the Aegean. When I would ask for instructions from Washington as to what we could do about this, the U.S. position was, well, we call on both parties to restrain their passions, to calm down and let the crisis pass and negotiate a solution--basically, a hands-off posture. We didn't want to get involved in such a serious dispute between two prized and valued allies.

Q: Two NATO partners.

KUBISCH: Two NATO partners. It was becoming increasingly clear to me that if we didn't do anything, that if somebody didn't do something, the Greek Government had no choice but to send naval vessels to intercept the Turkish Seismic and that there could be gun fire and a conflict between the two countries.

In the meantime, I learned that Prime Minister Karamanlis was getting advice and recommendations from his own subordinates in his foreign ministry and his legal

department that Greece's position was a sound, legal position based on the 1958 Law of the Sea Convention which Greece had signed but which Turkey had not.

In looking into it I disagreed. I thought he was getting bad advice, and I told him so. I told him that if he sent Greek naval vessels out to intercept the Seismic, the Turkish ship, that he would not have the support of the world community and Greece would be isolated. I told him that, in my opinion, he was getting bad advice. I did this without instructions and without authority.

Q: Under what circumstances? Did you call on him?

KUBISCH: I was seeing him on other matters during this period and told him then. To my surprise, one Friday afternoon about 4:00, he called me on the telephone and said, "Ambassador, I've arranged for a small boat to take me out for a little recreation this weekend. I'm leaving tomorrow morning at 11:00, Saturday morning, and I wonder if you and Mrs. Kubisch would care to join me. It will just be us and no one else there to speak of, no other foreign officials and no other government officials. I would like to talk to you." So I said, "Yes."

I went out with him at 11:00 on Saturday morning and we stayed out until late Sunday afternoon. During that time I talked to him at length about why I thought he was getting bad advice. It had to do with whether or not this research vessel would actually "penetrate" the sea bed and drill, or whether it would merely drag a cable and take some "soundings" of the sea bed, which it would be legally all right for it to do from the standpoint of scientific explorations.

As a result of this weekend with him privately, and without the authority of my own government in Washington, I think I changed his mind. I could be wrong. But, in any case, he went back and authorized a press campaign to tell the Greek people that Greece was wrong, that their position was not a sound position legally, and that they would lose the support of the world community if they attacked the Turkish vessel. As long as the Turkish vessel didn't touch the bottom but merely took sonar soundings and so on, this was perfectly all right. And the whole crisis subsided.

Q: During that period the Department distributed to posts abroad a great deal of information on Law of the Sea which, of course, had been hanging around for years, the negotiations. Is that how you managed to inform yourself so closely on this issue?

KUBISCH: Yes, exactly. Just from materials that were available in the embassy, although I may also have requested materials from Washington, copies of documents or interpretations, and so on. I don't remember at the moment.

Q: Did you inform the Department of what you had done?

KUBISCH: Subsequently. And, as I recall, I got a well-done message back from them.

Q: When was that exactly?

KUBISCH: As I recall, it was in about August of 1976.

Q: Well, that was an issue between two allies, valued allies, as you put it. At this time, '76, about a year before you were to leave, was the bases question still the outstanding issue in the U.S., American relations at that time?

KUBISCH: It was one of the major problems. I'll just say one word more before we leave this problem between Greece and Turkey, and Cyprus, which is this. You may recall during this period, Henry, that the Congress had passed a law placing an embargo on arms shipments from the United States to Turkey until Turkey withdrew its military forces from Cyprus and changed its policy toward Cyprus. The Executive Branch of our Government under President Ford and Secretary Kissinger were, on the other hand, strongly in favor of shipping arms to Turkey. So the two policies were diametrically opposed. The Executive Branch of our Government felt that if we shipped arms to Turkey, we could maintain a cordial relationship with the Turks and could influence them more to moderate their policies on Cyprus.

The Congress, under great pressure from the Greek-American community and the so-called "Greek Lobby" in the United States, legislated the embargo and said that we weren't going to let Turkey have any arms or spare parts until they left Cyprus.

What became apparent to me then was the price we pay at times in our system of government with the separation of powers, which has so many benefits for us as a nation. In this case, for example, the policy being followed and advocated by the Executive Branch might have worked, the cooperation with Turkey and the supplying of arms, <u>if</u> it had gone forward. The policy of the Congress of withholding arms, embargoing arms and putting pressure on Turkey, might also have worked if <u>that</u> policy had been followed. But what was perfectly clear was that both policies could not work simultaneously. As a result, they tended to cancel out each other. They had the effect of paralyzing U.S. influence in the area; and we could not play, as a result, the role that the United States Government could have and should have played in bringing about a settlement of the Cyprus crisis.

Q: Well, without the benefit of hindsight particularly, what would have been your prescription then when you were there close to the scene and pretty well seized with the problem? What would you have suggested would have been the most useful way to work through the crisis at that time?

KUBISCH: The most useful way to work through the crisis would have been, in my view, to do what the Executive Branch generally wanted to do, to cooperate with the Turks--they, after all, had 600,000 men under arms and had the longest border with the Soviet Union and were a staunch ally--to work with them and cooperate with them in

trying to bring about a more moderate and compromising position on their part to deal with the Greeks.

I think that could have been done, and most of the people I knew who were well informed of the situation at the time felt the same way. But to threaten the Turks the way we did and to publicly pressure them the way we did with Congressional legislation, although it satisfied some emotional concerns of many people, actually helped to thwart the accomplishment of our objectives in the region.

Q: Did you as Ambassador have any contacts with the so-called "Greek lobby"?

KUBISCH: Oh, constantly. They were always sending delegations to Athens. I was meeting with them. They are wonderful people. Archbishop Yakovos, who is the head of the Greek Orthodox Church in the Western Hemisphere and lives in New York, and is still the Archbishop there, came many times to Greece; and I dealt with him and through him, with others and through the Greek delegations that came. But the feeling on this issue was intense back in the United States among many Greek Americans. In fact, they felt that they helped bring about President Ford's defeat for reelection in 1976 because many of them had been Republicans and supporters of the Republican President and shifted their support to President Carter. They felt they played a major role in the defeat of Ford in 1976.

Q: Well, now on a bilateral problem, bases. It's a rather large subject. It goes on year after year during this period, does it not?

KUBISCH: Yes, it does. It still goes on to this day. I think the negotiations themselves, the bases and facilities they covered, have been well presented in a number of documents that are available to historians and students.

I think I would just like to make one major point about these. Prime Minister Karamanlis told me on a number of private occasions that there was no danger that the bases would ever be closed in Greece, that Greece's "vocation" was with the West and that Greece would remain a part of NATO and allied with the United States. But, he said, it would take time to repair the feelings of the Greek people against the United States. He said he knew how to handle that and to please trust him and work with him on it.

When the negotiations were first to begin concerning the bases, the Greek Government named an ambassador, an official of the Greek foreign ministry with the rank of ambassador, to head their negotiating team. At my recommendation, the U.S. Government named the DCM in our Embassy in Athens, Minister Stearns, as head of our negotiating team. And those negotiations went on for a year or so. Then Stearns was transferred to be our Ambassador to the Ivory Coast just when the negotiations were almost complete. I took them in hand myself for the final months and brought them to a conclusion, following which I left Greece in July, 1977.

I used my imminent departure from Greece as a means of bringing the negotiations to a conclusion. I said to the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the Defense Minister of Greece, if I leave Greece without these negotiations completed and the documents initialed, you can be sure that my successor will want to reopen the whole thing, and all of this work we've been doing the last year and a half will be down the drain. It worked very well because we got the agreements just a few days before I was to depart and return to the United States, all the documents, the basic agreements, the annexes, the attachments, and many documents initialed.

Then later, as you know, Henry, I also became a Special Negotiator on the Spanish base negotiations. We have important base negotiations not only with Greece and Turkey and Spain, but the Philippines and many other countries. So I've now been in a position of dealing with important base negotiations in the different capacities: when my DCM underneath me headed them, when I did it myself as the Ambassador in the country, and when I went as a Special Negotiator with the rank of Ambassador to another country. And I would just say that I am an unreconstructed advocate of having a Special Negotiator having the rank of Ambassador to head such negotiations. I could give all kinds of reasons for this.

I remember very well in Greece that when the DCM was handling the negotiations and an impasse developed between him and his Greek counterpart and the two delegations, I could go privately to the Minister of Defense in the Greek Government, or to the Prime Minister or the Foreign Minister and, on a first name basis, work out a compromise with them that could then be given back in the form of instructions to the negotiators and the negotiating teams to settle. It was a great channel I had. The moment my DCM left and I became the negotiator in Greece, I was on a par with the Ambassador in the Greek Foreign Ministry who was the head of the negotiating team on the Greek side. And whenever an impasse developed between us, I found that the Minister of Defense or the Foreign Minister or the Prime Minister would call us both into his office, the American Ambassador and the Greek Ambassador in charge of their negotiating team, and sort of knock our heads together, so to speak, until we came up with some kind of settlement or compromise. I had been pushed down in the hierarchy and had lost my private, behind the scenes, highest level channel.

At the same time, when I went to Spain as a Special Negotiator, I found that, coming from Washington, I could be a very effective and hard negotiator, knowing very well the views of all the military services in the United States and the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department and others. I could represent their views vigorously, leaving our Ambassador in Spain at the time to have his private channels available and to be the nice guy while I was the "heavy" leading the team from Washington.

Q: The good cop, bad cop.

KUBISCH: Yes, the good cop, bad cop technique.

Q: Did you find that you had adequate instructions from the Department in, let's say, these two negotiations, the Greek and Spanish base negotiations?

KUBISCH: Oh yes, because being a Special Negotiator, I would go back to Washington, in the case of the Spanish negotiation, meet with all the interested parties and leaders there, and help draft my own instructions which would then be sent out from Washington. Then I and my negotiating team would go to Spain, receive those instructions and carry them out. So it was very, very effective.

I must say that there is one high State Department official who does not share my view about Special Negotiators, or at least didn't a few years ago. That is Lawrence Eagleburger, who at the time came in as Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and has now just been named by Secretary Baker to be the new Deputy Secretary of State. Larry Eagleburger and I have been colleagues for many years and worked very closely together on a number of things, and I have very high regard for him both professionally and personally. But on this matter he and I disagree.

He believes, or believed at least a few years ago, that the resident American Ambassador should conduct these kinds of base negotiations, not a Special Negotiator from Washington. And I have the feeling that he believed that in part because, I think, his only post as Ambassador abroad was in Yugoslavia; and in a country such as Yugoslavia, under Marshall Tito, and in the case of many such regimes, an American Ambassador is very much restricted in what he can do, where he can go, and how he spends his time. Therefore, he has the time available to do very complicated negotiations. But in a democratic society such as Greece, or Spain, or the Philippines, an American Ambassador is busy morning, noon and night, seven days a week, 52 weeks a year. These negotiations are very, very time consuming. They go on day after day after day and back at the embassy at night, writing reports and requesting new instructions by the opening of business the next morning and so on. Therefore, while I think he should oversee them closely and pitch in when needed, I don't think a resident Ambassador in a democratic society should be required personally to conduct negotiations such as these.

Q: Did you privately think, at that time, that the bases were necessary for the NATO defense structure?

KUBISCH: Well, based upon the framework at the time, the responsibilities the U.S. Government had undertaken and the missions we had in the Eastern Mediterranean, they were necessary. I had the feeling they were too large and too over-staffed, and they were certainly creating a number of problems in our bilateral relationships with the Greek Government and the Greek people. They could have been, and were, during my three years as Ambassador in Greece, curtailed somewhat. Whether or not the force structure is required, and the missions are appropriate today, and whether or not we can afford all the bases, and whether or not we should continue with them now, I think those are different questions.

Q: I want to wind up this particular tape, believe it or not with a question that goes back, I have to flip flop back. I have to go back to Greek and Turkish relations again. The last six months or so that you were there, the last few months that you were in Athens, Clark Clifford came out.

KUBISCH: Yes, that's right.

Q: Do you recall any memories of that visit or personal impressions that you can leave with us?

KUBISCH: Yes, I do. Clark Clifford, I came to know him well during the course of that visit and saw him frequently when I was back in Washington later. I have also been his guest on several private occasions. In fact, he recommended me to the President for another very senior position abroad, one that I was not able to accept.

He came as a special emissary from President Carter to Greece to try, I think, to accomplish two things. First, as a kind of a temporizing measure effort on the part of the new Carter Administration in early 1977, to let the people of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, and the Greek American community in the United States, to let them know that the new administration of President Carter was seized with their problems, and was going to do something about them. Second, for Clifford himself, to try and find some way out of the impasse in which we found ourselves between Greece and Turkey with respect to the Cyprus problem.

So Clark Clifford came and traveled back and forth among the countries concerned. He stayed with me in our residence while he was there. He's a brilliant, charming, wonderful man, and there's no one I have ever seen come as a special emissary from a President, and I've seen a number of them, for whom I would have higher regard.

Q: You put him on a par with Harriman then, that kind of elder statesman?

KUBISCH: Yes, I would say so. In fact, I saw Harriman come on a special mission to Brazil in 1963 when I was there. And I have, as you know, a very high opinion of Harriman, too. But I have the feeling that Clifford did an even better job in a more difficult situation than Harriman did in Brazil at the time.

Q: ...the possibility that a discussion of how an embassy works, and the possibility of discussing the operations of a Foreign Service post, in general, might well be of some interest to the scholar in the future. This is not to denigrate the knowledge of scholars, or anything of that sort, but rather to bring to their attention detailed information that is not normally available to someone who has not served as DCM, who has not served as an ambassador. Let me get your views then, at whatever length you want to present them, on how an embassy is run; how an ambassador prepares for an assignment; how a DCM runs an embassy; how an embassy is organized, or whatever you want to go into.

KUBISCH: Well, thank you Henry, I'd be glad to express some thoughts and views on this subject. As you know, I have acted as DCM in three major posts, Brazil, Mexico, and France. I was Ambassador in Greece, and had several other assignments with the rank of Ambassador. And as Assistant Secretary in ARA, the Latin American division of the State Department, I helped prepare a number of Ambassadors and DCMs for their assignments in Latin America.

Let me start by summarizing how an Ambassador prepares for his assignment abroad.

After he is nominated by the President to the Senate, he contacts the Senators there and makes arrangements for his hearing. A request for Agreement goes out, that is, agreement by the host Government to the ambassador's appointment to their country, since this Ambassador will serve as a principal channel of communications between the two Governments and the chiefs of the two Governments.

Then a public announcement is made, and he begins a set of briefings at the Desk, the Country Desk in the State Department. He also has briefings in the Regional Bureau. He goes to the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the State Department. He starts to read on his assignment. He usually gets an office in the division, near the Country Desk of the country where he is going, and he starts reading the telegrams, talking to people, going through briefing books, sometimes reading hundreds of pages of important back messages and other things.

Then he starts going around to other Departments and Agencies of the U.S. Government: CIA, the Pentagon, the National Security Council Staff at the White House, Commerce, Agriculture, Treasury, various places. He goes to New York and meets with officers and directors of major companies doing business in that country.

Q: How long does he have for all of this?

KUBISCH: It's customary to have at least several weeks. Sometimes, it's a little longer, and sometimes, it's more urgent than that. But certainly, a few weeks can be put to very good use in preparing for an assignment. Also, it depends on his requirements as far as language is concerned, because he may have a period of language study required.

For example, when I was assigned as DCM in Mexico, I had never studied the Spanish language, although I had professional ratings in French and Portuguese, and understood Spanish. I managed to get about 7 or 8 weeks of full-time intensive Spanish language study before I went there. It was invaluable because the first week after I arrived, as I mentioned in one of our earlier meetings, I was put in charge of a task force, where we conducted negotiations on Operation Intercept for some six weeks in Spanish, day and night. So that's important. Then, finally, he goes to Capitol Hill and has his formal hearing with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

So a lot of preparation goes into the assignment, in advance of his departure. And a lot of thought goes into the arrival of the Ambassador at his post, because that has to be carefully orchestrated, so he doesn't get off on the wrong foot. I used to recommend to ambassadors going abroad, wherever possible, to manage their arrival as follows: Try to arrive on a Thursday around mid day, late morning, or mid day; meet privately at the airport in one of the lounges, or VIP rooms, with the 8 or 10 key members of the Country Team, the DCM, various counselors and other members; shake hands with them; if their wives are there, say hello.

Then have a press conference in an adjacent room at the airport. Read an arrival statement that's been carefully drafted in advance in Washington, and cleared with the Embassy. No questions and answers, just photographs.

Then proceed to the ambassador's residence, where he meets with the staff, of the residence, and freshens up a bit, particularly if he's had a long overnight flight or traveled across many time zones. Then, at the end of the day--around six o'clock--have about an hour reception for the senior members of the staff and their families to meet him and his wife. The next morning, Friday morning, to meet his own office staff, his secretary and staff assistants, and executive assistant, and so on. Have a classified Country Team meeting at the Embassy, at the Chancery, as we use to call it.

Then meet with the entire staff of the Embassy, if possible, both local and American. Indoors, if possible, although when I arrived in Greece, we had to do it out of doors because there were several, maybe, three or four hundred involved. I prepared some remarks and spoke to the entire staff in English and some Greek, expressing our happiness at arriving there. Everyone is very eager to see the new Ambassador and his wife, and to hear him and be able to say that they've seen him and talked to him.

Then, that Friday afternoon and the weekend really, just have meetings with key members of the staff, and sort of rest up for things that come the following week, because an ambassadors' first week at his post is a very crucial week. Should I make a few comments about what he does that first week?

Q: Yes, when do you plan to present your credentials? Is that always worked out in advance?

KUBISCH: No, as a matter of fact, that's usually done right after the arrival. Indeed, it is not unusual for the Ambassador to express to the host Government's representative at the airport (normally, the Chief of Protocol) his desire to call on the Foreign Minister as soon as possible. A request is also presented to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the Embassy saying the Ambassador has arrived and requesting an appointment with the Minister of Foreign Affairs to present a copy of his credentials.

Usually, the Minister of Foreign Affairs will receive the new ambassador very soon after his arrival. If he arrived on a Thursday or Friday, usually Monday, Tuesday, or

Wednesday of the following week, he has an appointment with the Foreign Minister. He is not really free to move around, at all, outside his embassy until that time, in terms of contacts with others. He then presents copies of his credentials to the Foreign Minister and at that moment he is then authorized to conduct relations with the staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, between his Embassy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At that time, the Ambassador also requests an appointment with the Chief of State.

Q: Through the Minister of Foreign Affairs?

KUBISCH: Yes, through the Minister of Foreign Affairs to present his original credentials. That is often arranged within a week or ten days thereafter. In some countries, it is a very formal ceremony, and in others, less so. He presents his credentials to the President, or the reigning monarch, whoever the Chief of State is, and he meets with the Prime Minister, the Head of Government, if there is one.

Following the presentation of his credentials, he is then free to do business with all Departments of that Government, and to begin his calls on allies of the United States and others. Usually, soon after his arrival, American Ambassadors try to meet, and offer to call on, say the British Ambassador, the German Ambassador, the French Ambassador, or in Latin America, the Argentine, Mexican, Brazilian, and other important Ambassadors. He also begins to visit other U.S. Government facilities, military bases, if there are some, as there were in Greece, and are in a number of countries, other embassy buildings, U.S. Information Agency offices, AID offices, economic assistance groups, Peace Corps, etc.

I always recommended and I did myself, after about one week, after arrival at the post, to send a rather brief, but several page message to the Secretary of State of my first impressions of the post. I recommended it to our ambassadors, when they went out, that they do a similar thing, because the Secretary and other top people in the Department of State are interested to see what are the Ambassador's first impressions and first reactions.

Q: Do you make this highly subjective, then, the first impression?

KUBISCH: Yes, and as a first person message. Since my arrival here, I've done this, and my impression is that, and I met with the Foreign Minister who said this, and told me to tell you that, and so on.

Q: That's the kind you can perfectly well dictate. You don't have to sit down and think and think and think over it. Let me back up one step, please. Have you ever seen instances when the old and new ambassadors overlapped?

KUBISCH: At the post, no. I've never known of one, and it's considered undesirable. What usually happens is the American Ambassador who is departing his post leaves, comes back to Washington, and, in Washington, he meets with the Ambassador who is going out to the post. They have meals and meetings together and discuss various things.

Then the new Ambassador goes to the post where the DCM, the Deputy Chief of Mission, has been serving as an interim chargé, in charge of the embassy.

Q: Is it not also true, that often the chargé, the DCM, if he is there for any substantial period of time, will normally soon have to leave also?

KUBISCH: Yes, that's true. That happened to me in Paris, for example. Our Ambassador in France departed France in late summer or early fall of 1972, and I had been Chargé for a few months, intermittently, before his departure. He traveled outside the country some, was absent. Then I was Chargé for a protracted period of about 7 or 8 months, and got so used to dealing, as I had to, with the President of France, with the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and others, that when the new Ambassador arrived in April of '73, it had already been pre-arranged, as I've explained in one of our earlier sessions, that I would leave.

It would have been awkward for the new Ambassador for me to have remained there, because they might have still called me. He wasn't as familiar with our problems or our discussions. The Ambassador really needs to be at the forefront of the U.S. presence in the country. So someone who has been Chargé for any length of time probably should leave, and the Ambassador should have the opportunity to select his own DCM, because that working relationship is so central to the successful management of the mission.

Q: Okay, back to the first week.

KUBISCH: Well, the first weekends with the Ambassador sending a personal first-person message back to Washington, giving his impressions.

Then he embarks upon the second phase of his stay there, which I usually describe as around three months, or his first 100 days. It is during that period that he establishes his work program for himself and his mission. He makes sure his objectives, and the mission's objectives, goals and strategies, are well understood by the personnel of the mission. He gets his own working program and format in place. He completes his calls on all the host government officials, and all the diplomatic corps that he plans to call on. It used to be that calls were made by incoming ambassadors in many capitals on every member of the diplomatic corps, every chief of mission with whom one's country maintained diplomatic relations, following which there was a return call.

That's no longer the practice now. Usually, the initial calls are made at the discretion of the incoming ambassador. He calls on as many of the other chiefs of mission as he chooses. I, personally, found it advisable to call on all, or nearly all, and recommended that to a number of ambassadors who consulted with me about it. Because a new ambassador in a post, if he calls on host Government Ministers and officials, and foreign Chiefs of Mission, has the opportunity of saying "I've just arrived. I don't know very much about this. What do you think?" And he can learn a great deal in a very short period of time. He has the opportunity to do this. It is a lost opportunity, if he fails to do it. It

enables the ambassador, in just several months, really, to learn a great deal about his assignment, and the country, the views of experts from other governments, to give him some perspective on the problems with which he will be required to deal.

Then, at the conclusion of those calls, say at the end of 90 or 100 days, he can have a major reception at his residence. That will be the first major social function that he hosts, and invite them all and their wives, all the officials. In a sense, that enables them to pay back his call, and for him to show some hospitality. That official reception, after some 90 or 100 days, is also kind of an announcement to the government, the diplomatic corps, and the people of the country, that he is fully in business now. I also found it desirable during that first 100 days to have identified the 500 or so key individuals in the country, in all the sectors of the society.

Q: My heavens, who did that?

KUBISCH: There are biographic files at the Embassy, as you know.

Q: I know they are in Washington, out at Langley, too, but who pulled it all together for you?

KUBISCH: The Ambassador asks the various Section Chiefs of his Embassy. To the press attaché he says, "I want to know who are the principal editors, publishers, reporters, columnists, and writers that I personally need to get to know." He says to the commercial attaché, "Which businessmen do I need to get to know, and give me the names of 10, or 20, or 30?" And to the scientific attaché, "Which scientists do I need to know?" To the cultural attaché, "Which university presidents, or chancellors, or professional people, or cultural leaders do I need to get to know?" He does this, with the assistance of his immediate staff in the Ambassador's office, his executive assistant, his staff aide, his secretary or two secretaries, if he has them.

They begin to pull these lists together, and he begins to set up priorities. He identifies the 500 or so principal people in the country, that really are the leaders in the country, in government, and outside of government, in opposition political parties, etc. He works out a program to get to know them. In some cases, he wants only to know them, but not to meet with them. In others, he wants to have an acquaintance with them. In others, he wants to have them to his home and entertain them. In others, he wants to call on them in their office.

I always found it desirable to call on the principal editors of newspapers, and publishers of newspapers, in their office, and get to talk to them on a background basis so that they would know me as the Ambassador, and what kind of a person I was. Also to travel around the country to the other principal cities and visit constituent posts, the consulates, if there were any.

Q: Weren't some of these people startled to have you call upon them?

KUBISCH: Perhaps they were startled. Some were. Some expect it. Some accept it, without really expecting it, and without being startled, but there were some that were startled. I remember calling on one newspaper publisher, who owned several newspapers in Athens. They were most critical of the United States and U.S. policies. Everyday they were lambasting the United States, and writing editorials; and he, I think, was startled when I requested an appointment and went to see him. We became acquainted, and after some months, I went to his house as a social guest, and he came to mine. Whether it influenced the policies of his newspapers, I would not say. I think it might have moderated them a touch. Maybe not, but it was useful, I felt.

Q: What you're describing, though, was tremendously time consuming, was it not?

KUBISCH: Yes, but I'm of the view, Henry, that a Chief of Mission, an American ambassador abroad in a democratic society should spend about a third to a half of his time outside his office in the Embassy--traveling in the country, meeting with the kinds of people that I am talking about, going on visits, making calls, having discussions, learning about things first hand, making his presence felt and seen, and doing the business of the U.S. And about the remainder of his time should be in the Embassy overseeing the operation and functioning of the Embassy. It is so easy for an Ambassador to live and work in an ivory town, and his insights and judgements suffer.

Q: How many ambassadors, that you have personal knowledge of, met that kind of breakdown in their time, more or less, that you can recall?

KUBISCH: I'm sorry to say, very few. I think most professional ambassadors have their own way of approaching their mission and their assignment. Most career ambassadors come up with a program along the lines of the one I have described, with their own personal variations. But it depends upon the character, the nature, the professional experience, and the goals of the ambassador. Some ambassadors I've known are very, very scholarly and introspective, and spend practically all their time in their office, or in the embassy, writing and thinking, maybe making a public appearance once a month, to give a lecture or a speech in some carefully chosen forum.

Some considered it a waste of time to go and call on ambassadors of other countries, and adversarial ambassadors like the Soviet ambassador, or the Chinese, and others. So various ambassadors have their own approaches. This was my approach. This is what I recommended to ambassadors, and this is the path that I followed, myself. I think it is desirable.

Q: Just to change the subject for a moment, but not permanently, how is it that you came to be called upon to brief ambassadors going abroad, or to prepare ambassadors going abroad?

KUBISCH: I think some people in the Foreign Service and in the Department knew that I was interested and had shown some competence in this field, going back to my first assignment in Brazil in 1947, where I did a comprehensive paper of a couple of hundred pages on our embassy in Rio and on the organization and functioning of a typical American diplomatic mission abroad. That came to the attention of some people in Washington, and led to my assignment to the Marshall Plan headquarters in Paris, when we were setting up the Marshall Plan missions.

Then, as a DCM, I helped ambassadors with their programs, and observed and learned from my ambassadors. I served under, I guess, a number of them and saw how they conducted themselves. Then, when I was Assistant Secretary, I had the authority, the opportunity, to counsel ambassadors going abroad. So I seized that and took advantage of it.

For example, after President Reagan was elected he appointed Ambassador Evan Galbraith to be our Ambassador in Paris. My name had also been proposed to go as Ambassador to Paris by the outgoing Ambassador, Arthur Hartman, who had been asked to propose some senior member of the Foreign Service to be his successor. Art had been Assistant Secretary in the European Bureau of the State Department when I was Ambassador in Greece. We knew each other well and he recommended me. Then when President Reagan decided to appoint Ambassador Galbraith, I was asked by the Bureau of European Affairs if I would meet with Ambassador Galbraith and consult with him about what I thought he should do on his arrival and during his early weeks and months in Paris.

Q: The kind of thing that you're recounting now?

KUBISCH: Exactly.

Q: Now, Ambassador Galbraith is on record as being highly critical of Foreign Service officers. What kind of reception did you have from him in your dealings with him, and attempts to help prepare him for a post at which he had already served as a banker, as I understand, for quite sometime?

KUBISCH: I'm not keen to go into that. I saw him only a couple of times during his first week or two, after it had been announced that he was going to be the new ambassador. He was making his rounds and getting briefings and learning about his assignment. I sensed, at the time, that he did not want to go as a traditional ambassador and do traditional things in France. He expressed to me a couple of things that he intended to do with the then President of France, François Mitterrand. I just knew, knowing Mitterrand, knowing France, I thought they had zero possibility of having any impact. It would only make Ambassador Galbraith appear somewhat foolish.

Anyway, he had his own approach. Particularly, I've observed this, Henry, in businessmen abroad. They have such a narrow view of what the role of an ambassador and an embassy

is. They often think it is basically to advance the commercial and economic interests of the American business community. They don't have a clue as to the other 95% of things that an embassy does: serving the larger interests of all the people of the United States of America, as a whole, and not just the business interests.

So many of the non-career ambassadors that I've known, with a few exceptions, like Harriman, David Bruce, and Lincoln Gordon, have a very narrow, superficial view of what the role of an ambassador is.

Cy Sulzberger, who used to live in Paris and was a member of the family that owned and published the New York Times, used to write a column three times a week from Paris. I used to meet with him occasionally, privately, and have lunch, and we would talk. I think we both found those get-together worthwhile. He wrote a column once about the wisdom of assigning a non-career ambassador to a major post like Paris. In his view it was comparable to taking a businessman or amateur and putting him in charge of a large aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean. He is so ill-equipped, unprepared and has such a narrow, shallow view of what it is an ambassador should do.

Q: Yes, I've seen that acknowledged before. Well, for the non-specialist, for the person who is read into the subject, but does not necessarily know all the details, what does an embassy do?

KUBISCH: Perhaps I should say a few words about how a typical American embassy abroad is organized. The reader of this paper may not know that as well as you and I do.

Before I leave the other subject about what an ambassador should do, I would like to say one more thing. I recommended to ambassadors with whom I had a chance to meet before they went on their assignments that they write and send to Washington periodically major, overall, first-person statements giving their personal views on issues of importance. For example, after his first 100 days at the post, there could be an overall assessment made by the ambassador, with segments drafted and proposed to him by elements in the embassy, but in which he really expressed his own views.

I also made it a practice on the first day of every year, on January 1st, to send in such a message; also at the time of an election, or just before an election, or following an election, and so on. It's a good idea to have a periodic rhythm of communications directly from the ambassador to the highest levels of the U.S. government, because so often routine third-person embassy messages are not read by the President, by the Secretary of State, by other Cabinet Officers, or immediate sub-Cabinet levels in Washington. So I think that's a good practice to follow.

But coming to the organization of an embassy, most American Embassies abroad, medium and large-scale Embassies, are directed by the Ambassador, known as the Chief of Mission, and his immediate deputy, the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM), who at large posts also has the rank of Minister. Then the major sections of the Embassy under the

Ambassador and the DCM are: the Political Section, the Economic Section, the Administrative Section, the Consular Section, and the U.S. Information Section for cultural and press matters. In addition, there are a number of attaché offices: the Defense Attaché; with Army, Navy, and Air Force Attacks; the Treasury Attaché, in some posts; the Commercial Attaché; the Agricultural Attaché; the Legal Attaché, usually the FBI office (in some posts we have FBI representatives); the CAS office, the Controlled American Source, or CIA station; the Civil Aeronautics Attaché; the Drug Enforcement Agency; maybe the Customs Attaché, and others. There is a wide range of functions, sections, and divisions in an Embassy, depending on where the Embassy is located, and what the requirements are with the host country.

Q: Of course, any embassy that had all of those things would be extraordinarily large, one of our largest embassies.

KUBISCH: I think that's true. I really have in mind as I talk about them, the Embassies in Brazil, Mexico, France, and Greece, which all four are very large. All our Embassies used to be classed and, I think, still are into four classes, One, Two, Three, and Four. There are about, I guess, 15 or so Class-One Embassies, the largest three or four in each major region of the world. Those four I just named were all Class-One Embassies. There are, of course, many smaller embassies where they don't have that many people and that many different attacks.

In addition, in some Embassies, there are Consular posts elsewhere in the country. In Greece, we had one, in Thessaloniki. In France, we had five: Marseille, Lyon, Bordeaux, Nice, and Strasbourg. In Mexico, we had 19 Consulates; in Brazil, seven. In some posts there are large U.S. military forces, too. In Greece, we had about 6,000 American military personnel, and a number of major military bases there. The Ambassador oversees and gives policy guidance to all of those, too. So that's the way an Embassy is organized.

You might ask me how an Ambassador runs an organization of this size and scope. I'd be glad to tell you how I did it, and how I recommended it to others, if you wish?

Q: Yes, I certainly would.

KUBISCH: The first thing one needs to realize is that an Ambassador abroad, an American Ambassador, is really on duty 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. It is not unusual to be working, off and on, all of those hours, and all of those days. There are no holidays. He is on call all the time, and he has to be well informed all the time.

In my own case, I would go into my office in the morning, and during the period from about 8 a.m. to 9 a.m. every morning, either at my residence, where someone would bring me overnight telegraphic traffic and messages, or at my office, I would go through the traffic. I would also meet with my personal secretary and assistant and discuss my schedule and appointments for the day.

Then at 9:00 every morning, I met with the DCM. We had a fifteen minute discussion every morning. By that time, he also was well informed of what had happened since we parted company the evening before, in terms of overnight developments. We would meet and discuss these things and who in the Embassy was going to do what, when.

Then, from 9:15 to 10:00 every morning, in the major embassies, there are usually two briefings for the Ambassador, the DCM, and a few others. One is the CIA briefing, and the other is a press briefing. In Paris, for example, the Ambassador and I, and usually three or four other key members of the Country Team, would meet in his office every morning. We would have a French speaking person from the Press Office come, who had been up, maybe, since 4 or 4:30 in the morning going through all the newspapers, listening to all the radio and news programs, seeing all the morning television shows, looking at new magazines that had just come out, clipping and choosing and picking. Then he would do about a 10- or 15-minute summary in French of important press developments, a kind of press briefing for us early in the morning.

Then we'd go into the "Tank," as it is called, the secret, enclosed room, which is not penetrable by foreign intelligence agencies, and have a CIA briefing.

Then, at about 10 in the morning, three days a week, I would have meetings with the Country Team. There are really two elements of the Country Team, two parts. There is the immediate Country Team consisting of the DCM, the Counselors of the Embassy, the Defense Attaché, and the CIA station Chief, about 6 or 7 people, and I used to meet with them twice a week, usually Monday and Wednesday.

Then, once a week, usually on a Thursday or a Friday morning at 10:00, have about an hour meeting with an enlarged Country Team, that would include all the Attacks. That sometimes went to 20 or 25 people. I felt those meetings should be rather longish meetings. I wasn't one for conducting, and don't favor having quick, sharp Country Team meetings, but rather fairly full exchanges of views. This is an opportunity for officers to present the biggest issues and have an exchange with the Ambassador and other key members of the Country Team about them. And if any subject required more intensive discussion then we could set up a separate meeting and get a group together for that discussion.

Q: This had its usefulness, I'm sure, you just said so, and it also helped to keep people happy. It also used up a lot of your time, did it not? So many people like to talk.

KUBISCH: Well, it's true, but when I had meetings in my office, the meetings were always scheduled for 15 minutes, 30 minutes, or 60 minutes, depending on the number of people to be present, and the complexity or detail that I felt we should go into. I think when people know, in advance, how long the meeting's going to be, they tend to control their presentations, with that in mind. If not, the person presiding or chairing the meeting has to keep it moving along. I felt those meetings were a very important instrument for me in directing such a large and disparate organization.

After these meetings, I would spend the rest of the day, when I was in town and in the office, with appointments, with dictations, with writing, with thinking, just quiet spells, and maybe some meetings or visits outside the Embassy. Then at the end of the day, about 6:00, a second meeting with the DCM to go over events of the day, and to be available to him to review, consider, and approve outgoing messages from the Embassy in the name of the Ambassador that I personally needed to review. Usually, there were two, three, or four of those everyday, out of many dozens.

Q: It seems a little unnecessary, maybe, at this point to interject, but all cables normally are third-person, and all cables are signed with the last name of the ambassador or the officer-in-charge at the post. But the first-person kind of cable, that you were talking about earlier, is an effort on your part to flag the personal interests of you as the ambassador or a chargé having written the message.

KUBISCH: That's right.

Q: This is supposed to get the attention of the audience in Washington, whoever you slug it for, and I've seen that sort of thing--I'm just giving you a chance to catch your breath--the other Ambassador Galbraith, the one who was in India, was famous for sending that kind of message in, and he always sprinkled in a few four letter words.

KUBISCH: Some profanities.

Q: Some profanity, so as to grab the attention of them.

KUBISCH: To make sure that people read it.

Q: Yes.

KUBISCH: There are little devices like that, I think, that some ambassadors use. When Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith served in India as Ambassador in the early 1960s, I was serving in Colombo, Ceylon, now it's Sri Lanka; and I saw a copy of one of his messages, and one phrase comes to mind. It is apropos of something you said earlier about non-career ambassadors going to posts abroad, thinking they know so much about the country, because they were a banker in that country, or were a businessman there, or studied the language and know how to speak it, and they know some people there. They think they know all about the country and are rather disdainful of consulting with the so-called "professionals," the experts in the State Department or the Embassy. They want to conduct things with some newness, some freshness, some difference in their role as Ambassador.

I think they disregard the advice and counsel of professionals and experts at their peril. John Kenneth Galbraith made that point very well in a message from New Delhi once to Washington. He said that there were people who came out from Washington--this was in

connection with a large AID program, an economic assistance program to India--who had their own way of approaching things, and were not going to listen to their predecessors or try to learn from local "experts." They would go around India, go to various parts of the country, and work without advance consultations with anybody, and waste a lot of time. Finally, as Galbraith put it in this memorable phrase, he said they would "joyously re-discover the already known." I think that happens to a lot of non-career people.

Q: Yes, this coming from a man who was not all that complimentary about Foreign Service officers, either.

KUBISCH: That's true.

Well, you asked me what I, as an Ambassador, did in Greece, and, as Chargé, in France, Mexico, and in Brazil, when I was the Economic Minister and Director of the AID mission there. What kind of things do you do outside? Let me give you a couple of examples.

Q: You were going to give me an example.

KUBISCH: ...examples of what an ambassador does and should do outside the embassy in meetings with others.

I always found it desirable to have periodic meetings with the press. I divided the press into the American press resident in that city, other foreign press, and the domestic local press. I used to have periodic meetings with them as groups, in my office or in my residence for a drink about 6:00 in the evening. Sometimes the meetings were on "background," where they could use the information but could not attribute it to me by name, where I was trying to get a point of view of the United States clarified or explained. Sometimes there were on-the-record meetings where we wanted, really, to publish and attribute to me or the Embassy views that we held.

Often we had smaller meetings with one, two, or four, luncheons or meetings in the office or at home with key groups. There is a tradition in Paris, as you probably know, Henry, where the Ambassador or the Chargé is to meet with certain key editors in French newspapers and magazines at certain intervals. There was a group of four, and there was a group of two, and there was a group of eight; and the Ambassador or the Chargé was expected to meet with them periodically and explain American points of view. This was very helpful to them, I think, and helpful to the United States.

I also felt it was desirable to have periodic meetings with the American business community. So about on a bi-monthly basis, about once every 60 days or so, sometimes 90 days, I would invite the principal American business leaders in the country, not just the capital city, but in the country, to come to the Ambassador's residence in the late afternoon, around 5:00. I'd have several key officers of the Embassy there with me, the Economic Counselor, the Commercial Attaché, and I. We would make brief presentations

and remarks to the group, then take their questions, standing in front of them. They would all be seated in a large room. Then offer them some refreshments and let them go. That sort of kept them informed of what was going on and we learned a lot from them as well. So these kinds of meetings are desirable.

Q: Did you encounter from American businessmen, in the countries in which you served, the attitude that the embassy should be doing more for them?

KUBISCH: Yes, I encountered that view often. I've also seen, in one country, an American Ambassador, who was not a career ambassador, who disdained to meet with the American business community. They were very resentful of it. They felt he was depriving himself of valuable information that they could give him and denying them information they were entitled to have.

The American business community, really, expects and feels entitled to periodic meetings with the Ambassador and key members of his staff. They ask for assistance all the time.

You know, just to touch on a couple of other things quickly to terminate this, if you wish, this particular subject--

Q: I'm in no hurry to terminate it. There are one or two things I want to raise with you, additionally.

KUBISCH: All right. I was going to get into some of the mechanics and problems of diplomacy. How instructions are formulated, and received and carried out by the Ambassador and the Embassy.

Q: Walk me through an example, then.

KUBISCH: Instructions come from Washington, usually, on any number of subjects. The instructions are usually drafted in Washington, in the State Department, by one of the Offices or Desks. Then, because of this particular instruction's impact on other collateral or ancillary issues, that instruction in written form has to be shown to and cleared by other Offices, Divisions, and Desks in the Department of State. Finally, it's dispatched over the name of the Secretary of State and received by the Embassy. Usually, those instructions are thoughtful, well-presented and understandable. Sometimes, they are not.

When the instructions are received, if they are good instructions and carefully prepared, the DCM in the Embassy in consultation with the Ambassador gives an assignment to one of the Embassy Sections or Officers to carry out the instructions. Depending upon the importance of the subject, the level of the reply is decided upon and the level of contact in the Host Government is decided upon. All good embassies have a plan for covering the Host Government.

In most of the Embassies I have served in, the Ambassador retains to himself the responsibility of dealing with Ministers of State, Cabinet Officers, and sometimes their immediate Deputy Cabinet Officers. The DCM, then, takes the Under Secretary levels and the consulars take the Assistant Secretary levels. The Labor Attaché takes care of certain people in the Labor Department, the Agricultural Attaché in the Agricultural Department, etc. There is a plan of level of contact by embassy officers with host government officers. So it is important, when an instruction is received, to decide at what level the instruction should be carried out, and then to decide what officer should carry it out.

Sometimes the instructions are unclear. Sometimes they are unwise. So the Embassy asks for a clarification, or asks for a reconsideration of the instructions before carrying them out, and points out objections to them, or considerations which may not have occurred to those who dispatched the instructions.

Q: Would you agree that it is relatively rare that the embassy reacts in that fashion?

KUBISCH: Relatively rare, I would say.

Q: Would you agree, further, that most instructions coming from the Department of State, the Washington establishment, in other words, are relatively routine in nature?

KUBISCH: Yes, I would. There is a great mass, as you know, thousands and thousands of instructions that come out of Washington to embassies all around the world all the time on the widest possible range of subjects. Most of them are routine. But that great mass of business has to be conducted by the United States and its representatives abroad with some 140 or 150 countries around the world.

Some instructions, however, are very important, very complex; and the following happens on occasion and works very well. Suppose, for example, it's possible to go back to Washington and draft one's own instructions. For example, when I was negotiating the treaty with Spain on our air and naval facilities in Spain, I knew what the Spanish would accept, and I and my delegation had consulted very carefully about the kind of instructions we needed. We would go back to Washington and meet with people in the Pentagon, the various military services, the State Department, and elsewhere. We would draft the instructions that the negotiating delegation needed in Spain. We would draft them, and ourselves try to clear them around Washington. Then we would turn them over to the State Department for review, and for dispatch over the authority of the Secretary of State. Then we would go back to Madrid and receive the instructions and carry them out. That works very well, too.

There are a number of other things we could touch on, including, for example, social life and entertaining. Most amateur ambassadors and non-career people think that's the most important thing an ambassador does. I have even heard one ambassador, a non-career

ambassador, say that he didn't really want the post, but he was taking it because his wife liked parties.

In the experience of most career ambassadors, however, the social life is a necessary evil, almost, because you work hard from early in the morning all day long, and you hardly ever have any time off. Then, to get home late in the evening, and in Greece, for example, where dinner is begun at 9:00 or 9:30 P.M., to take a shower and shave and change clothes and put on a black tie and go out to a dinner and stay up to midnight was the last thing in the world you wanted to do.

Q: I'll drink to that.

KUBISCH: Right. As an Ambassador in a post like Paris, Athens, or Mexico, an ambassador has 20 or 25 social invitations a week. Sometimes three or four a night. You can't possibly go to them all. But it was not unusual for my wife and me, and this is true in Washington, too, for Assistant Secretaries, if I would get four or five invitations for one evening, to decline two, and I would go to one function, one reception in one car. My wife would go to a second one in another car and explain that I was tied up. Then we would meet somewhere at a third place for dinner. It is exhausting. It really is exhausting. It is a necessary evil, but something in which people are slighted if you don't come. You can offend other governments and host nationals if you don't go. They are very useful, too, in many ways.

Q: Wait, wait, I'm not disagreeing, I want you to elaborate on that point. Why are they very useful, social contacts and that sort of thing?

KUBISCH: Well, I have found that in meeting with, let's say, senior French officials at a party, and sitting next to them, or having a cocktail or a cup of coffee after dinner and talking to them privately, a personal relationship of greater mutual trust and confidence is established. That's vital, of course, to the success of any diplomat abroad. After that relationship is established, it is possible to discuss very important subjects in a personal, off-the-record way, and learn some of the ins and outs of what is going on behind the scenes in the host government. That facilitates the accomplishment of one's instructions or mission.

So I found them very useful. To have a personal relationship and a social relationship served as kind of a lubricant in official relations.

We could also touch on matters of security, mission security and personal security, public appearances, travel, the operations of an ambassador's residence, crisis management in the event of a kidnaping or an embassy occupation, or an assassination, someone like the CIA station chief that we covered before, or President Kennedy. I was in a key role in an embassy when President Kennedy was assassinated.

But I think that perhaps just mentioning those things, following our earlier conversation today, would be sufficient to give people an idea of how an embassy works, what ambassadors do and what I did, unless there is any one of those you want to go into in greater detail.

Q: There is one item you might want to go into in greater detail. Let me see if you had any specific examples in mind when you mentioned crisis management. Was that the riots in Athens, or what exactly were you thinking of when you said that?

KUBISCH: Well, for example, we discussed in an earlier meeting the occupation, for a brief period by demonstrators, of our embassy in Athens. This became a very important event for a short period of time. It happened about 8:00 one evening, and by 9 or 9:30, I had set up a crisis management center in the embassy, brought in key officers to deal with the immediate crisis of protecting the embassy for the balance of the night; to arrange to handle the press inquiries; to arrange to report the matter to Washington; to answer inquiries from concerned friends and relatives about injuries or deaths--fortunately, there were no deaths, but there were a number of injuries--to deal with visitors from the Host Government, the Minister of Defense, and others who had come; and with a barrage of telephone calls and journalist inquiries; and so on. We set up a little task force to deal with those kinds of questions. I met with them more or less continuously, giving them guidance on how I thought they should handle various things.

Q: Did you set this up under the DCM?

KUBISCH: The DCM was there, came in, and participated, yes, but I guess in this particular case I ran it myself.

Q: What were your criteria for selecting people to put on this crisis management committee or whatever you want to call it?

KUBISCH: What we did that evening was to get those people who were most qualified to contribute and who were available. Some we couldn't reach or find. But, you know, like the DCM, the Press Attaché, the Security Officer, the Administrative Officer, the Political Counselor, the Non-Commissioned Officer-in-Command of the Marine Security Guard, people like that.

Another example might be the following. When I was Assistant Secretary of State, our Consul General in Guadalajara, Mexico was kidnapped. The kidnappers had him in custody in Mexico. This must have been in early the summer of 1973. The Consul General's name was Terrence Leonhardy. Our Chargé in Mexico at the time was Robert Dean, and our Ambassador was Bob McBride, who was absent from the country, as I recall.

I set up a crisis management task force in Washington, where we have, as you know, in the State Department, a half a dozen offices in the Operations Center that are specifically

designed for managing a crisis. We got six or eight people up there, kept open lines of communication to Mexico both secure and open; and the various people dealt with the crisis and gave guidance. As it turned out in this case the kidnappers got in touch with the Mexican Government and asked for a ransom, the equivalent of about two million dollars, for Consul General Leonhardy. They also asked for the release of 15 prisoners from jail, that were colleagues and friends of theirs that the Mexican Government was holding. Also a plane to transport those 15 and the kidnappers, themselves, to Havana. There were some other demands.

The Mexican Government got in touch with our Embassy Chargé, and said, "What should we do?" The Chargé got in touch with our task force managing the crisis in Washington to ask what he should say. The Secretary of State at the time--must have been in '73, because William Rogers was Secretary--would stick his head in every couple of hours to see what was happening. It took several days to resolve the crisis.

Q: When the Mexicans asked what should we do, what did you respond?

KUBISCH: I believe I can remember. The issue was basically this. The Mexican Government did not want Consul General Leonhardy murdered. Obviously, our personnel, his family and friends, and the U.S. Government didn't want him murdered either.

Q: That goes without saying.

KUBISCH: That all goes without saying. On the other hand, the policy of the United States Government at that time was not to accede to the demands of terrorists and not to negotiate with terrorists. To give in to their demands would automatically, according to this line of thinking, endanger other Americans and American officials all over the world.

So it became a real dilemma, and our Chargé didn't know what to do, what to say to the Mexican Government. The instructions we gave to the Chargé, that I gave to him personally, really sort of walked a narrow line because there was no way that the Secretary of State and the U.S. Government would countenance direct U.S. negotiations with the terrorists or accede to their demands.

We told the Mexican Government what <u>our</u> policy was and that we did not negotiate and did not accede to such demands, but we stopped short of telling them what they should do. Our Chargé handled it in such a way that the Mexican Government did negotiate with the terrorists over a period over several days and obtained the release of Consul General Leonhardy. They gave in to some of the demands of the kidnappers, but not all, and the U.S. Government policy, as such, was not ruptured.

Q: There may have been some oral counseling involved?

KUBISCH: Yes, as I recall, there was.

Q: I've seen exactly this in another country, handled that way.

KUBISCH: It's a terrible dilemma for the officer in charge of the crisis to try to resolve because the pulls in all directions are very heavy.

Q: Let me switch gears just a little bit. I mentioned to you earlier in the day, I spoke to you about a young engineering student, really a first class student here at North Carolina State.

KUBISCH: Oh, yes.

Q: Who was thinking of changing from the sciences to the liberal arts, and who would do well, I think, in either. Disregarding pride in organization and a sense of your attachment to the Foreign Service in the past on a sentimental basis, would you recommend the Foreign Service as a career to a young man of that sort, if he were to walk in the door, here, again today?

KUBISCH: As you know, you and I both have high regard for the Foreign Service, and a deep and life-long attachment to it. I would want to know the young man, personally, before I would venture to advise him whether or not to enter a career in the Foreign Service. I think I would point out the pros and cons of such a career and let him make his own decision. Suffice it to say that I have one son and one daughter who asked me the same question and I advised them to try to go into the Foreign Service.

Q: Those two are in the Foreign Service?

KUBISCH: As a matter of fact, neither of them is in the Foreign Service today. One son who would have been a great asset to the Foreign Service took and passed the written exams, and was failed in the oral exams. He graduated from Tufts University and was one of ten that was being considered by the Board of Examiners from New England, and for geographic dispersal reasons, they were only going to take three from New England, and he was not among the three best qualified. He was very disappointed and never took the exams again.

Q: He should have taken them again, of course.

KUBISCH: He should have, but in the meantime, he went on to have a very successful career in business, including international business. My daughter, who took the Foreign Service exams the first time, failed them. She took them a second time, passed the writtens and failed the orals. She took them a third time, passed the written exams and the oral exams, as well as the security and the physical and all the other exams. After a period of some months she was finally offered an appointment in the Foreign Service. In the meantime, she had gotten her master's degree from the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton, and was a personal staff associate to David Rockefeller in New York, and had

been offered a very important position with the Ford Foundation. So she didn't accept the Foreign Service appointment.

Q: That was the Foreign Service's loss, I'm sure.

KUBISCH: I think so. She would have been a great success.

Q: Well, I don't think you would have warned off, then, this young man, this young engineering student with whom I spoke earlier today. You would not run him off, in other words, talent of that sort?

KUBISCH: I would not. I would encourage him, because I believe the United States needs highly qualified and highly motivated people to represent it in the Foreign Service abroad. I would feel it almost an obligation to try and encourage good ones to apply, good promising young people.

However, the person to watch out for, in my opinion, is that person who wants to serve only in Paris or London, who is not interested in world-wide service, who is not highly motivated, and who is not prepared to go through the heavy, hard work, long hours, personal and family hazards, that are associated with life abroad for a U.S. Foreign Service officer. They have to be highly motivated and want to do it, and look upon it as an opportunity to serve.

Q: You said those who would want to serve only in London or Paris. There is nothing wrong with Rome.

KUBISCH: Rome, yes, there are a few that want only those posts.

Q: Let me ask you just briefly, casting back, what was your greatest achievement, do you think, in the Foreign Service, and do you have any significant disappointment that you can recall?

KUBISCH: Well, that would want some reflection, to give a really good response to that, I suppose, Henry. Let me just think aloud and make some offhand comments. I don't believe there is any one action, episode or period in my Foreign Service career that stands out as my greatest single achievement. I think, rather, I would say it was the opportunity I had to serve in several very important posts, that we've been discussing in this interview, at very important times. I consider that service a very great privilege. I feel there is nothing I could do, this may sound a little sentimental or maudlin, but I really believe it, there is nothing I could do that could possibly repay the Foreign Service for the opportunities I've had to serve. They have meant a great deal to me, and, to me, made my life worthwhile.

Q: So it is a question of?

KUBISCH: The composite of my service at senior levels. I think, probably, I could put my finger on, however, more specifically, my greatest disappointment. Growing up as I did in the United States in the '20s, '30s, '40s, and serving in the Navy in World War II, and in the Foreign Service afterwards, I was of the view that the United States had a great deal to contribute to the world in political, economic, moral, and other ways.

When the Alliance for Progress program was announced for Latin America, I was very happy to be assigned to head the largest mission that we had in Latin America, in the country of Brazil in 1962; and I was there for several years. That program, that ten year program, was in my mind a very thoughtfully conceived program, and one that would bring to bear the resources that the United States had to help the countries of the hemisphere.

You asked me earlier if I thought it had been a success. Had it accomplished what it set out to do? I said no. Did it accomplish some things? The answer is yes, but I think my biggest disappointment was that it didn't accomplish more. That was for me and for many of my generation a kind of loss of innocence about what the United States of America could do in other countries, and marked, I think, a changing role for the United States in the world, much as Vietnam did in the military field.

Q: That's a slightly different comparison, the Alliance for Progress and Vietnam is something I hadn't thought about. I'll consider that further. Meanwhile, let me thank you once again for your willingness to contribute to the oral history program. These remarks, I'm sure, will be found quite interesting by everyone who reads them. Any last moment words of wisdom?

KUBISCH: I think not. I think I've imparted about all I care to at this time, except to thank you and Stuart Kennedy, and others connected with this program. I consider this an opportunity to present some views that I am very glad to have available, because I have been approached from time to time by scholars, students and others. I've been asked if I've written some memoirs and where my papers are, and I just haven't had the time or the inclination to write them. But I have had some views and some ideas, and here and there, some knowledge about some things that might not be generally known or appear elsewhere. The opportunity to participate in this program, to record them and to have them available through this project, I consider very worthwhile; and I thank you, and Stuart, and all for the opportunity.

Q: No, It's for us to thank you. So now, some of your ideas, anyway, will be available in this collection of interview transcripts.

End of interview